Haftar’s Eastern Gambit: New Allies Amid Egypt Rift

Key Takeaways on the Cairo–Benghazi Standoff

In the closing weeks of 2025, relations between Egypt and Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar cooled to their lowest point in years. Cairo fears that the eastern Libyan strongman, lured by Abu Dhabi, has turned southern Libya into a rear base for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, upsetting a fragile regional balance.

Egyptian officials warn that weapons, fuel and fighters now transit from Fezzan through Darfur toward the RSF. President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s entourage frames the issue in national-security terms, linking Sudan’s fate to the stability of Egypt’s southern and western borders.

Widening Cairo–Benghazi Fracture

Tensions did not erupt overnight. Since mid-2023, Egyptian advisers have watched Haftar expand his diplomatic room for manoeuvre, irked by what they see as paternalistic tutelage from Cairo. A June 2023 visit by Saddam Haftar, the marshal’s influential son, was meant to thaw relations; it produced lavish protocol but scant political traction.

The stalemate emboldened rival patrons. Diplomats note that Emirati envoys encouraged Haftar to deepen involvement in Sudan’s war, calculating that a weakened Khartoum army would leave space for Gulf influence across the Red Sea corridor. Egypt regards that calculus as perilous to its own water and trade lifelines.

Sudan Conflict Spills into Fezzan

Satellite imagery of Tmassah airstrip and desert convoys over recent months, reported in regional media outlets, suggests that ammunition crates and diesel tankers cross Libya’s ill-policed Sahara. Analysts say Haftar, whose forces dominate sparsely populated south and east Libya, trades logistical access for future leverage over Sudanese gold routes.

A senior Egyptian intelligence officer, quoted anonymously in Cairo papers, warned that ‘foreign interference and mercenary flows will boomerang on everyone’. Yet Haftar’s entourage insists the marshal merely seeks to secure porous borders and denies direct combat support to the RSF.

Gulf Capitals Court the Libyan Strongman

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, now openly at odds in Yemen, compete to shape Libya’s post-conflict architecture. Both view Haftar as a disciplined operator able to protect energy corridors and curb Islamist factions. Saudi emissaries have floated reconstruction packages for Benghazi’s port, while Emirati firms eye Sirte’s planned free-trade zone.

Such courtship feeds Cairo’s concern that its traditional sphere of influence is narrowing. Egyptian diplomats reference the ‘2014 handshake’—when Haftar first aligned with Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood—as a bond now under stress.

Cairo’s Tactical Outreach to Tripoli

On Monday, Egypt dispatched its deputy intelligence chief to Tripoli. The delegation met Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah, signalling that Cairo retains options across Libya’s fragmented landscape. By warming ties with western factions, Egypt telegraphs a warning to Haftar: regional autonomy does not mean strategic independence.

The visit allows Egypt to underline shared concerns such as counter-terrorism and energy infrastructure safeguarding, while reminding international actors that Cairo remains an indispensable gatekeeper in Libyan affairs.

Actors and Motives

Khalifa Haftar seeks to translate battlefield control into diplomatic bargaining chips, diversifying patrons to avoid over-reliance on a single capital. Egypt aims to prevent encirclement by hostile militias and foreign militaries along its western and southern flanks. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia pursue influence over trade arteries linking the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Sahel.

Sudan’s RSF views Libyan desert access as critical for supplies after clashes severed traditional routes through Khartoum. Each player calculates that short-term gains outweigh the risks of regional escalation, yet none can fully insulate itself from spill-over violence.

Timeline of Escalation

June 2023: Saddam Haftar’s high-profile trip to Cairo ends without breakthrough. August–November 2024: reports mount of materiel movements from Sebha to Darfur. 8 December 2025: President el-Sissi summons Haftar and his two soldier sons for a tense meeting in the Egyptian capital.

12 December 2025: Egyptian media publish warnings against ‘foreign meddling’ in Sudan. 15 December 2025: Cairo’s intelligence envoy lands in Tripoli, hinting at alternative alliances.

Scenarios for 2026

Should Haftar heed Cairo’s admonitions, he could scale back RSF assistance in exchange for resumed Egyptian military aid and joint patrols along the Kufra corridor. A second, more volatile scenario sees Haftar doubling down, prompting Egypt to foster new security pacts with western Libyan rivals or even tighten its own border deployments.

A third, negotiated path involves a broader regional dialogue under African Union auspices, linking Libyan stabilisation to Sudanese ceasefire talks. For now, the marshal appears convinced that strategic ambiguity offers him maximal leverage.

What It Means for North Africa and the Sahel

The Egyptian–Libyan misunderstanding reverberates beyond bilateral ties. Chad fears that unchecked arms flows could destabilise Tibesti, while Algeria monitors the situation to forestall extremist infiltration through its southeastern flank. European capitals, preoccupied with migration and energy supply routes, quietly urge de-escalation to prevent a wider security vacuum.

The episode underscores how the Sudan conflict, though centred in Khartoum, now shapes calculations in Benghazi, Cairo and Riyadh. It also spotlights the capacity of non-state factions to redraw alliances across deserts where borders remain largely theoretical.

Why Haftar Still Holds the Cards

Despite mounting pressure, Haftar controls key oil terminals and eastern airspace, enabling him to monetise hydrocarbons and negotiate overfly rights. His forces’ grip on Benghazi and Derna offers staging grounds for partners seeking footholds in the Mediterranean. This leverage explains why condemnations from Cairo have yet to translate into coercive measures.

Until Egypt decides that Haftar’s Sudan gambit outweighs the benefits of cooperation, the relationship is likely to oscillate between terse summits and pragmatic coordination, a dance familiar in the region’s history of strongmen diplomacy.

Outlook

For now, Egypt’s messaging is calibrated, not confrontational. Haftar, aware of domestic rivals and his need for external legitimacy, may test the limits but is unlikely to sever ties entirely. Gulf overtures provide him with bargaining chips, not escape routes.

The coming months will reveal whether Sudan’s war becomes a catalyst for a broader realignment or merely another pivot point in Libya’s fluid power map. Either way, the Cairo–Benghazi axis remains the hinge on which regional security turns.