Haftar’s East Libya Courts Ankara in Quiet Power Play

Rapid thaw in Ankara–Benghazi relations

A low-profile yet relentless diplomatic shuttle is welding together interests that, only a few years ago, appeared irreconcilable. The eastern Libyan camp led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar now finds Ankara’s red carpets increasingly familiar. The courtship accelerated in 2025, culminating two days ago with another visit by Saddam Haftar, the marshal’s influential son and vice-commander of the Libyan National Army, received successively by Turkey’s foreign and defence ministers.

The Ankara stop marked Saddam Haftar’s third appearance in Turkey this year, an unusual rhythm that underscores a deliberate drive to anchor the eastern bloc in Turkey’s wider regional agenda. Officials on both sides framed the talks as routine, yet the tempo alone signals a qualitative shift away from past distrust.

Strategic calculus behind repeated visits

Turkish officials perceive momentum on the ground: the Libyan National Army remains the most cohesive military actor in the country. Engaging the strongest card, Ankara calculates, is a prerequisite for safeguarding its long-term interests and averting exclusion from any post-conflict settlement. Hence the deliberate multiplication of face-to-face meetings even while official rhetoric avoids trumpeting a formal alliance.

For the Haftar camp, the outreach offers direct access to one of the Mediterranean’s more assertive middle powers. Re-branding Benghazi as a partner rather than adversary to Ankara opens doors to diversified military kit, potential investment flows and a diplomatic lever within broader Mediterranean conversations.

Balancing Tripoli while embracing the east

Turkey’s policy architects tread a tightrope. Their relationship with western Libya is rooted in earlier defence accords and remains robust. Ankara therefore frames the new eastern opening as complementary rather than substitutive, insisting it still recognises existing arrangements with Tripoli. The dual-track design allows Turkey to be present in every Libyan forum, whatever configuration emerges.

By avoiding zero-sum language, Ankara projects itself as indispensable mediator as much as stakeholder. It positions Turkish envoys to speak to all factions, reinforcing the country’s self-image as the principal external actor able to translate Libyan fragmentation into leverage rather than liability.

Benghazi as Ankara’s gateway to Central Africa

Behind diplomatic niceties lies a commercial roadmap. According to the Libyan National Army communiqué, the sides discussed using Benghazi’s port as a logistics hinge for Turkish exports toward Central Africa. The plan fits Ankara’s strategy of shortening supply chains and undercuts competitors vying for similar corridors through Egypt or Algeria.

If realised, Turkish goods could sail into Benghazi, overland to Kufra and from there toward the Chad–Sudan belt, reaching markets in Central Africa that Istanbul judges underserved. For the eastern authorities, acting as a conduit would translate into customs revenue and a measure of economic normalisation after years of isolation.

Energy ambitions in the Mediterranean gas belt

Energy keeps the engine running. Offshore gas fields off Libya’s eastern coast continue to magnetise Ankara’s strategists, who aspire to become the leading investor in extraction and associated infrastructure. The Haftar camp, once wary of Turkish rigs edging into its maritime backyard, now appears less hostile so long as revenue-sharing formulas look equitable.

Mutual benefits are explicit. Turkey secures privileged entry to hydrocarbon acreage that can complement its own energy diversification efforts. Eastern Libya, endowed with reserves but starved of investment, finds a technically capable partner ready to channel financing and equipment at a moment when Western majors adopt a wait-and-see posture.

Security cooperation: from concept to doctrine

Military cooperation stood at the centre of the Ankara meetings. The communiqué mentioned discussions on “stability” and joint responses to regional security challenges. Although no public detail emerged, the vocabulary hints at training programmes, intelligence liaison and possibly coordinated patrolling to deter smuggling along Libya’s porous borders.

For Turkey, embedding with the Libyan National Army enlarges its strategic footprint from the Aegean to the Sahel. For Haftar’s entourage, a security partnership with a NATO member upgrades its status and may blunt criticism that the east relies solely on Russian or regional Gulf patronage.

Implications for the wider Mediterranean theatre

The rapprochement redraws the diplomatic map. A Turkey that talks to Benghazi as comfortably as to Tripoli can neutralise rival initiatives while amplifying its bargaining power over maritime boundaries and resource allocation. Mediterranean actors will watch how Ankara leverages the eastern connection in ongoing conversations on sea-lane security and energy grids.

Within Libya, other factions must account for a Haftar camp newly armed with Turkish avenues. The balance of power could shift at the negotiation table rather than on the battlefield, as the prospect of Turkish investment and military cooperation reinforces Benghazi’s confidence in political talks.

A cautiously optimistic horizon

None of the actors claims to have finalised binding treaties, yet the frequency and symbolism of the meetings leave little doubt: a new period of cooperation is under way. Whether the momentum matures into formal agreements will depend on Libya’s fragile internal dynamics and on Ankara’s ability to reassure western Libyan allies.

For now, both sides reap immediate dividends. Ankara secures visibility and optionality; the Haftar camp unlocks external validation and potential funding. The chessboard is being rearranged one quiet handshake at a time, and Turkey, by engaging the camp it once confronted, appears determined to remain the game’s primary strategist.