Will the FDLR Finally Lay Down Arms in Eastern DRC?

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Ce qu’il faut retenir

On 10 October 2025 the Congolese army urged all factions of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, to disarm and surrender, in line with the June Washington Peace Accord between Kinshasa and Kigali (RFI). The move could reshape the security equation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo after decades of cyclical violence.

US State Department adviser Massad Boulos hailed the announcement as a “decisive step” that advances the accord, eases repatriation, restores state authority and bolsters regional stability. Yet the road from communiqué to cantonment remains long, logistically heavy and politically sensitive.

Contexte sécuritaire des Grands Lacs

The FDLR emerged from génocidaires who fled Rwanda in 1994 and have since entrenched themselves in North and South Kivu. Kigali brands the group an existential threat, while Congolese communities accuse it of predatory taxation and land grabs. Past disarmament drives faltered amid mistrust and shifting alliances.

June’s Washington deal offered a rare moment of convergence between Presidents Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame, committing both capitals to dismantle hostile armed networks. FARDC’s October order operationalises that pledge and challenges the FDLR leadership to choose between safe return or renewed confrontation.

Calendrier opérationnel

FARDC issued detailed instructions to field commanders on 1 October, ten days before the public call, mandating outreach with local chiefs to convince fighters that surrender would be orderly and dignified. The army wants first hand-overs before the end of the year, a tight window given terrain, insecurity and harvest season movements.

MONUSCO, tasked with supporting disarmament, says it is still clarifying expectations with Congolese authorities. Since 20 June the mission has already facilitated the voluntary repatriation of twelve foreign combatants linked to the FDLR and Nyatura militias, a modest rehearsal for the 1,500-2,500 returnees now anticipated.

Acteurs clés en coordination délicate

For Kinshasa the priority is symbolic: showing that national forces, not outside armies, drive the process. A senior FARDC officer stressed that “it is not up to us to tell MONUSCO what it must do; we are doing our part. The UN should do its own, and Rwanda must prepare to receive its citizens” (RFI).

MONUSCO brings technical depth in demobilisation, but its drawdown calendar and contested legitimacy limit room for error. Kigali, meanwhile, faces the complex task of screening ex-FDLR members for crimes while ensuring reintegration packages that discourage recidivism. Washington’s diplomatic leverage may be called upon if trust frays.

Regional implications for Great Lakes stability

A successful surrender would deprive multiple Congolese armed groups of an ally, potentially weakening coalitions that thrive on shared supply routes and ethnic narratives. It could also remove a chief justification for any future cross-border operations by Rwandan forces, lowering interstate tensions.

Conversely, a botched process risks splintering the FDLR into hard-line factions, some prone to forge ties with Islamic State-inspired cells in north-eastern DRC. Such an outcome would complicate the security map and test the patience of donors already fatigued by prolonged crises.

Scénarios possibles

Optimists envisage phased corridors where ex-combatants gather at pre-identified sites under FARDC escort, then transfer to MONUSCO-run transit camps before repatriation. Transparent biometrics and community dialogues would reduce revenge attacks and offer Kigali verifiable data.

A middle-path scenario foresees partial compliance: field commanders surrender while hard-liners retreat deeper into parks and artisanal mining zones. MONUSCO would then face a protracted chase against agile remnants.

The worst-case scenario involves parallel offensives by other armed actors seeking territorial gains as FARDC diverts resources to surrender sites. Such disruption could sabotage the entire Washington framework and revive rhetoric of mutual suspicion between Congo and Rwanda.

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Salif Keita is a security and defense analyst. He holds a master’s degree in international relations and strategic studies and closely monitors military dynamics, counterterrorism coalitions, and cross-border security strategies in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea.