West Africa’s Silent Arms Revolution Powered by China

Kwame Boateng
6 Min Read

Ce qu’il faut retenir

Between 2020 and 2024, 26 % of all weapons imported by West African states came from China, eclipsing Russia and France (SIPRI 2024). The surge coincides with a 100 % jump in the region’s overall arms purchases compared with 2015-19. Beijing’s portfolio now ranges from armoured personnel carriers to combat drones, offered on terms many cash-strapped Sahelian treasuries find irresistible.

Growing Chinese Footprint in Sahel Procurement

Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali posted the sharpest growth, each doubling or tripling orders in four years. Chinese VT4 tanks were paraded in Ouagadougou last December, while Bamako’s new CH-4 drones logged their first sorties over the Gourma corridor in March, according to military sources in the Malian capital.

Contexte

Regional armies, overstretched by jihadist insurgencies and transnational crime, need hardware fast. Traditional suppliers often bundle sales with lengthy training cycles, human-rights vetting or parliamentary approvals. Beijing’s state-owned Norinco and AVIC bypass much of that, promising delivery in six months and financing via the Export-Import Bank of China. The offer dovetails with broader infrastructure and mining deals negotiated under the Belt and Road banner.

Calendrier

The pivot toward Chinese equipment began in 2017 as Sahel joint-force casualties mounted. By 2020, Mali took receipt of the first batch of Norinco VN2C infantry fighting vehicles. In 2022, Côte d’Ivoire acquired FH-9 self-propelled howitzers ahead of an African Cup of Nations security plan. The watershed came in 2023, when Nigeria’s air force unveiled Wing Loong II attack drones, signalling Abuja’s strategic endorsement.

Acteurs

Norinco’s regional office in Abidjan functions as a hub, fielding engineers to forward bases from Niamey to Bobo-Dioulasso. On the political side, China’s special envoy for the Horn of Africa has multiplied stops in ECOWAS capitals, proposing security packages that bundle arms, police hardware and counter-terrorism training. Private brokers, many former officers, handle logistics and after-sales maintenance, creating a web of influence beyond formal embassies.

Scénarios

Analysts outline three trajectories. The first sees continued Chinese dominance, with local production lines—possibly in Nigeria—lowering costs further. A second scenario envisages a diversified market as Turkey and the UAE court the same clients with drones and armoured cars. The third, less likely near-term, foresees regional standardisation under an ECOWAS procurement pool, tempering bilateral deals but still counting on Chinese credit.

Technology as Field Test

Defence engineers in Beijing view West Africa’s harsh climate as an opportunity to stress-test new platforms. The desert-adapted VP11 MRAP debuted in Niger before entering the People’s Liberation Army inventory. Feedback loops are quick: sensor malfunctions reported by Ivorian crews in Korhogo last May were resolved with a software patch rolled out across subsequent shipments.

Cost and Conditionality

Chinese packages undercut Western bids by 15-30 %, insiders say. Payment schedules can extend over eight years, sometimes denominated in commodities such as bauxite or cashew exports. Importantly, contracts rarely attach political strings, a feature Côte d’Ivoire’s defence minister praised publicly in February. The absence of human-rights clauses, however, has drawn criticism from some NGOs, though governments argue that urgent security needs leave little alternative.

Training and Doctrine Shift

With equipment comes doctrine. Norinco instructors teach combined drone-artillery tactics at the Koutiala training centre in Mali, influencing battlefield decision-making. Nigerian officers note that software interfaces are in Mandarin-English hybrids, nudging cadres toward longer stays in Chinese staff colleges. Such exchanges quietly expand Beijing’s soft power footprint beyond trade and infrastructure.

Implications for Regional Defence Autonomy

The reliance on a single supplier raises maintenance and ammunition compatibility issues. Yet some strategists argue that Chinese systems, being less proprietary than NATO equivalents, actually facilitate local assembly down the line. Ghana’s emerging defence industry park outside Tamale is exploring licensed production of Norinco calibres, a step that could seed genuine indigenous capacity if technology transfers materialise.

Ripple Effects Beyond West Africa

Central African partners, including Congo-Brazzaville, observe the Sahel experiment closely. Brazzaville’s 2022 memorandum with Norinco on coastal surveillance illustrates how lessons from the Gulf of Guinea piracy theatre feed back into procurement planning without challenging existing alliances. Diplomats underscore that the objective remains complementarity, not replacement, of traditional partners.

Looking Ahead

West African capitals face a delicate balancing act: meeting pressing security demands, managing debt exposure and navigating great-power rivalries. As long as insurgent violence persists and budgets remain tight, China’s blend of affordability, speed and strategic patience gives it a formidable advantage. Whether that reshapes the long-term defence architecture or merely fills a critical gap will determine the next chapter of the continent’s security landscape.

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