Prelude to selective statecraft
Donald Trump’s second tenure has largely side-lined the continent, but a change of tack was telegraphed on 27 June when he brokered a cease-fire between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, burnishing credentials before convening a smaller West-African cohort (Le Monde, 9 July 2025). The invitees share modest GDPs yet command deposits of manganese, bauxite, lithium and iron ore—commodities Washington now deems strategic for batteries and defence manufacturing. By declining to revive President Biden’s broad 2022 Leaders Summit, the administration signals that commercial alignment, not symbolic inclusion, is the ticket of entry.
Minerals first, governance later
A Bloomberg briefing notes that US Development Finance Corporation officials have drafted term-sheets for equity stakes in Gabon’s Belinga iron concession and Mauritania’s Tiris uranium prospect, contingent on local content guarantees. Yet industry lawyers caution that most of these jurisdictions still sit below the 40th percentile of the Fraser Institute’s mining-policy index. China already refines roughly 70 percent of global cobalt and has stakes in Gabonese manganese via CITIC, raising the price of US re-entry.
The migration quid pro quo
Reuters reporting suggests that the Department of Homeland Security will table “safe-third-country” memoranda compelling the five governments to accept non-African migrants expelled from the United States, echoing deals once touted with Guatemala . The Wall Street Journal adds that Dakar’s role as a springboard for Atlantic crossings gives Senegal leverage to demand expanded textile quotas in return. Civil-society coalitions, however, warn that outsourcing deportations to fragile states may breach non-refoulement norms and sabotage the US soft-power reset.
Aid cuts, lobbying spikes
Since January 2025 USAID disbursements to Sub-Saharan Africa have fallen by 42 percent, forcing cash-strapped capitals to retain Beltway lobbyists at record fees: Gabon alone signed a US $2 million retainer with Ballard Partners in May. Critics argue that such expenditures belie the professed quest for “home-grown growth” and entrench patron-client politics. Pro-summit diplomats counter that private advocacy is a prerequisite for navigating Washington’s labyrinthine Congress.
China, the unspoken guest
Beijing’s commerce ministry, without naming the summit, warned on 8 July that “third-party pressure will not alter Africa’s sovereign right to choose partners”. Chinese firms finance over half of Senegal’s current-account deficit and operate 60 percent of Liberia’s rubber exports. Trump aides privately admit the optics of a US come-back hinge less on signing ceremonies than on whether American investors can match Chinese timelines for port and rail delivery.
Risks of transactionalism
Diplomats recall that Trump’s 2018 promise of US$50 billion for African infrastructure never materialised. The current package is rumoured at US$1.1 billion—substantial for Bissau but a rounding error beside China’s US$60 billion Forum on China–Africa Cooperation pledges. Tafi Mhaka, writing in Al Jazeera, warns that a photo-op without durable financing will resemble “colonial theatre with PowerPoint animations”. Still, for governments reeling from commodity shocks and jihadist spill-overs, even incremental Western diversification carries strategic weight.
Outlook beyond the optics
If the summit produces enforceable term-sheets—tying mineral offtake to local processing, and migration accords to verifiable human-rights benchmarks—the initiative could recalibrate a lopsided relationship. Failure would reinforce perceptions that Washington’s Africa policy oscillates between neglect and naked extraction. Either way, the three-day gathering will test whether an “America First” White House can craft partnerships that are not zero-sum.
