In Washington’s Colin L. Powell Treaty Room on 25 April 2025, the foreign ministers of the DRC and Rwanda sat beside U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to sign a landmark “Declaration of Principles” for peace. The ceremony – witnessed by the flags of all three nations – marked the inauguration of a new bilateral diplomatic process aimed at ending one of Africa’s most protracted and perilous conflicts. Secretary Rubio, as host and mediator, hailed the moment as evidence of the United States’ commitment to “a peaceful resolution” in the Great Lakes region. Flanked by his Congolese and Rwandan counterparts, Rubio emphasised that “durable peace and long-lasting economic development” in eastern DRC, after 30 years of conflict, would require difficult work and sustained conversations. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, once closely linked by geography and history but torn apart by war, have now publicly signalled a willingness to turn the page. This article explores the significance of the Washington Declaration against the backdrop of historical DRC–Rwanda tensions and analyses the broader role of the United States in fostering this rapprochement.
The Washington signing is significant both symbolically and substantively. Symbolically, it is the first time in years that senior Congolese and Rwandan officials have jointly endorsed a diplomatic roadmap in the presence of a high-level international guarantor. Substantively, the Declaration lays out broad commitments addressing the core disputes that have fueled past crises – from mutual security concerns to economic cooperation. As Rwanda’s Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe noted, the accord “opens the door” to a definitive peace agreement by tackling the “root causes” of decades-old insecurity. His Congolese counterpart, Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, stressed that the day “marks not an end but a beginning, a necessary step towards peace taken with resolve and purpose”. Both emphasized that this is not merely a ceremonial gesture but a political commitment grounded in principles of international law, including the UN Security Council’s recent calls for withdrawal of foreign forces and armed groups from the DRC.
For diplomats and policymakers, the Washington Declaration represents a cautious hope that one of Africa’s longest-running conflicts may finally be on a path to resolution. However, experience tempers optimism with realism. Too many previous accords between Kinshasa and Kigali have faltered in implementation, undermined by mistrust or events on the ground. Thus, while this agreement is widely welcomed – the African Union, regional organisations, and observers have lauded it as a “positive and important step” – it also raises pressing questions. What has changed in the conflict dynamics to allow this breakthrough? How will the Declaration’s ambitious principles be translated into action, and what role will external partners, especially the United States, play in ensuring follow-through? The answers lie in understanding the complex history of DRC–Rwanda relations and the evolving international engagement in the region.
Historical Overview of DRC–Rwanda Tensions
Decades of distrust and intermittent conflict between the DRC and Rwanda have their origins in the tragic events of the mid-1990s and the ensuing Great Lakes crises. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 – in which Hutu extremists killed approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus – set in motion a chain of events that spilled into the then-Zaïre (today’s DRC). In the genocide’s wake, as Rwanda’s new Tutsi-led government took power in Kigali, an exodus of Rwandan Hutu refugees (nearly two million people) fled into eastern Congo. Among them were the génocidaires: members of the defeated Hutu regime’s army and militias responsible for the mass killings. These elements reorganised in refugee camps and borderlands of Congo, forming militant groups such as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), which continued to threaten Rwanda from Congolese soil.
Rwanda, under the leadership of President Paul Kagame, viewed the presence of hostile militias across the border as an existential security threat. In 1996, Kigali launched a military intervention into Zaïre, justified as a necessary action to neutralise Hutu extremist camps. Rwandan troops, alongside Congolese Tutsi fighters and backed by Uganda and other regional allies, invaded eastern Congo in what became known as the First Congo War (1996–1997). This campaign, which also had the aim of toppling Congo’s long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, succeeded with startling speed. By May 1997 Mobutu’s regime had collapsed; Laurent-Désiré Kabila, aided by Rwanda and Uganda, installed himself as president and restored the country’s name to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwanda’s security rationale for the war was clear – one Rwandan minister later argued that Mobutu’s Zaïre had “harboured those who committed genocide”, leaving Rwanda no choice but to intervene. However, the intervention was brutal in its own right. Amid the fighting, thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians perished; the methods employed by the invading forces against Hutu camps were later described by international observers as “amounting to war crimes”.
The removal of Mobutu did not bring peace. By 1998, the Second Congo War erupted – a far more complex conflagration often dubbed “Africa’s World War” for the number of countries involved. Relations between Laurent Kabila and his Rwandan and Ugandan patrons soured quickly. To distance himself from Rwandan influence (and shore up domestic legitimacy), Kabila purged Tutsi officers from the Congolese army and signalled that Rwandan troops were no longer welcome. He even allowed some Hutu rebel groups (including remnants of the FDLR) to regroup in eastern Congo, directly challenging Rwanda’s security interests. In response, Rwanda invaded the DRC again in August 1998, this time openly backing a new Congolese rebel movement (the RCD, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie) to overthrow Kabila. Uganda launched its own intervention, supporting a rival rebel faction. What ensued was a chaotic, multi-front war drawing in Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and others in defence of Kabila’s government, while Rwanda and Uganda’s forces occupied swathes of the east. During this 1998–2002 war, atrocities against civilians were rife and the DRC’s mineral wealth became both a target and fuel for conflict. By the time a peace deal was negotiated in 2002–2003, an estimated 3 to 5 million people had died as a result of the war and its humanitarian fallout – making it one of the deadliest conflicts globally since World War II.
Under the Pretoria Accord of July 2002, Rwanda agreed to withdraw its troops from the DRC in exchange for Kinshasa’s commitment to disarm the Hutu extremist militia on its territory. This accord, alongside a series of regional agreements and the deployment of a reinforced United Nations peacekeeping mission (MONUC, later MONUSCO), formally ended the interstate war. By 2003, foreign armies had pulled out and a transitional government in Kinshasa – which included rebel groups – was in place. Yet, despite these diplomatic breakthroughs, eastern DRC remained unstable. Many Rwandan Hutu fighters melted into the forests instead of disarming, and new local militias proliferated. Meanwhile, Rwanda maintained an active interest and influence in eastern Congo, often via proxy militias or by backing Congolese rebel movements when it deemed necessary.
One of the most consequential of these proxy episodes was the rise of the CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People) led by Laurent Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi rebel who fought the Kinshasa government in the mid-2000s with tacit Rwandan support. Nkunda’s rebellion destabilised North Kivu province until a unusual rapprochement occurred: in 2009, Rwanda arrested Nkunda and, in a joint operation with the Congolese army, both countries agreed to neutralise the FDLR Hutu militia. That temporary alignment of interests led to some reduction of the FDLR threat and an integration of some CNDP rebels into the DRC army. It demonstrated that Kinshasa and Kigali could cooperate militarily when interests aligned – but such cooperation was short-lived and did not resolve the underlying mistrust. By 2012, a new rebellion – the March 23 Movement or M23 – emerged, led by former CNDP officers who mutinied, claiming that the DRC government failed to honour peace accord commitments related to the CNDP’s integration. The M23, composed mostly of Congolese Tutsis, quickly became a major force and once again Rwanda was accused of masterminding the insurgency. In November 2012, M23 rebels even captured the city of Goma, the bustling provincial capital of North Kivu on the Rwandan border, marking a humiliating setback for the Congolese state. A subsequent UN investigation provided evidence of Rwandan support for the M23, causing international censure – the episode inflicted “lasting damage” on Kigali’s relations with Kinshasa. Under intense diplomatic pressure, including aid suspensions by some Western donors, Rwanda’s overt backing receded. In 2013 the United Nations Security Council took the unprecedented step of mandating an offensive brigade within MONUSCO to help the Congolese army fight the M23. The robust UN intervention and improved performance by the Congolese forces routed the M23; by late 2013 the rebels were forced to surrender or flee, and a peace declaration (the Nairobi Declarations of December 2013) formally ended that rebellion.
The period from 2013 to 2021 saw a relative, if deceptive, calm in DRC–Rwanda relations. On the surface, diplomacy improved: Rwanda maintained formal recognition of DRC’s sovereignty, and the two countries engaged through regional forums. The DRC, under President Joseph Kabila (who had succeeded his assassinated father in 2001), was preoccupied with internal politics and other rebel threats. Meanwhile, Rwanda’s security concerns persisted: remnants of the FDLR were still active in eastern DRC, and anti-Rwandan militants occasionally staged small attacks. Kigali accused Kinshasa of doing too little to eliminate these groups. For its part, Kinshasa accused Kigali of covertly exploiting Congolese minerals through smuggling networks and of harbouring ambitions in the Kivu region. Underneath the diplomatic niceties, deep suspicions remained on both sides.
A renewed turning point came after Félix Tshisekedi took office as President of the DRC in early 2019, following the country’s first (albeit contested) peaceful transfer of power. Tshisekedi initially sought a rapprochement with Rwanda. He met frequently with President Kagame in his first years, voicing a desire to improve economic ties and even inviting Rwandan investment in Congolese agriculture and mining. There were joint commitments to enhance trade – for example, new border posts and infrastructure projects were discussed. This thaw raised hopes that the cycle of conflict might finally be broken through proactive cooperation. Indeed, in 2019 and 2020, DRC–Rwanda relations were arguably warmer than they had been in decades.
Yet, the underlying conflict in eastern Congo festered. Dozens of militias continued to operate in the DRC’s east, many with shifting allegiances and external patrons. Among them, the quiet embers of the M23 rebellion had never been fully extinguished – its fighters had mostly dispersed rather than been demobilised. By late 2021, the M23 insurgents resurfaced, alleging that Tshisekedi’s government reneged on promises to reintegrate them and citing new grievances such as the persecution of Congolese Tutsi communities. Over 2022, the M23 steadily advanced in North Kivu, defeating government troops in a series of clashes. The DRC government firmly blamed Rwanda for this resurgence, echoing the pattern of 2012. Kigali, while denying direct support, argued that Congo’s own actions – including reported collaboration with the FDLR and new anti-Rwandophone militias – had rekindled the conflict. By late 2022, the situation had deteriorated into a proxy war-like scenario, with the DRC openly accusing Rwanda of aggression and Rwanda pointing to DRC’s alliance with genocidal elements. Diplomatic relations between Kinshasa and Kigali plummeted: ambassadors were expelled and fierce rhetoric traded. A “war of narratives” took hold, each capital presenting itself as the victim of the other’s malfeasance.
The Road to Washington: Recent Escalation and Mediation Efforts
The renewed M23 rebellion in 2022–2025 proved to be the gravest escalation in the region since the early 2000s. Despite efforts by African regional organisations to calm the situation, the conflict intensified throughout 2023 and into early 2024. The East African Community (EAC) deployed a regional force – consisting of troops from Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and others – to eastern Congo, but this mission struggled with limited capacity and contested neutrality. Diplomatic initiatives were launched in parallel: Angola’s President João Lourenço mediated a “Luanda process” in mid-2022 that secured a fragile ceasefire on paper, and Kenya’s former President Uhuru Kenyatta facilitated dialogues under the “Nairobi process”. Yet, these efforts yielded only temporary lulls. Ceasefire agreements repeatedly collapsed on the ground.
By late 2024, the M23 had gained control of large parts of North Kivu province, often with little resistance from demoralised Congolese troops. Then, in a dramatic turn of events in early 2025, the rebels achieved what was previously unthinkable: in late January, Goma fell once again to the M23, followed shortly by Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. These are the two largest cities in eastern DRC – major commercial and administrative centres – and their capture sent shock waves throughout the region. The fall of Goma on 27 January 2025 was a particularly grim signal, described by observers as a catastrophic security breach that “left the Great Lakes on the edge of a wider war”. As Goma was overrun, thousands of panicked residents fled, adding to what was already one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. United Nations agencies estimated that between 900 and 2,000 people were killed in the battle for Goma alone. The capture of these cities by a Rwanda-backed militia raised the spectre of a direct interstate conflict between the DRC and Rwanda. Kinshasa’s government, shaken to its core, accused Rwanda of a de facto invasion. Rwanda continued to officially deny involvement, but credible reports indicated that 3,000–4,000 Rwandan troops were operating covertly in eastern DRC in support of the M23 offensive. Indeed, a UN Panel of Experts had earlier found that Rwanda maintained military units inside DRC’s territory to assist the rebels.
With eastern Congo effectively under M23 sway, uncertainty loomed: would the rebels push west towards Kisangani or even the capital Kinshasa, as some of their rhetoric threatened? The M23, rebranding itself politically as the “Congo River Alliance” (AFC), declared an intention to march further and topple President Tshisekedi. However, many analysts believed Kigali’s aims were more limited – not conquest of all Congo, but rather securing a “buffer zone” in the Kivus, granting Rwanda strategic depth and access to rich minerals. Nevertheless, the situation was volatile. Other neighbouring countries were drawn in defensively: Uganda, which had a complex position of both cooperating with Congo against some rebels and being accused of abetting M23, reinforced its border. The risk of a regional conflagration – pitting Rwanda against a coalition of DRC and its allies – was palpable.
Amid this crisis, international diplomacy intensified as the cost of inaction became clear. The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2773 in February 2025, sending a clear message. This resolution strongly condemned the M23’s offensive and, crucially, explicitly called on “the Rwanda Defence Force to cease support to M23 and immediately withdraw from the territory of the DRC without preconditions”. It also urged the DRC to halt any support to armed groups like the FDLR and pressed both sides to return to talks. The resolution reaffirmed that there was “no military solution” to the conflict and that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC must be respected by all. This rare direct naming of Rwanda by the Security Council – effectively acknowledging an international armed conflict – was diplomatically significant. It reflected a consensus among major powers, including even Rwanda’s traditional friends, that the situation had become untenable.
Regional African bodies also scrambled to respond. The African Union appointed President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo as a special mediator in April 2025. His appointment was meant to inject new momentum into African-led mediation, though some critics noted the AU had been hesitant to call out Rwandan involvement bluntly. The East African Community and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) continued their efforts, though their initiatives were now effectively overtaken by events on the ground.
A turning point in breaking the diplomatic impasse came from an unlikely quarter: Qatar. In March 2025, Qatar leveraged its growing role as a conflict mediator to broker a surprise face-to-face meeting between President Tshisekedi of DRC and President Kagame of Rwanda in Doha. This was the first direct meeting of the two leaders in many months. The encounter, facilitated personally by the Emir of Qatar, led to both presidents issuing a joint call for a ceasefire and a commitment to further dialogue. Although the ceasefire they urged did not immediately hold – notably, just a day after the Doha meeting, M23 rebels captured the strategic town of Walikale, rich in gold and tin, underscoring their continued push – the ice was broken at the highest level. The Doha channel also opened communication lines to the M23: Qatari mediators hosted talks between Congolese officials and M23 representatives, achieving in mid-April the first direct negotiations in three years and even securing a tentative ceasefire between them. This Qatar-facilitated truce, though fragile, was an encouraging sign that dialogue was possible.
It was against this backdrop of intensified diplomacy – UN pressure, AU engagement, and Qatari facilitation – that the United States stepped forcefully into the fray. The U.S. had been monitoring the deteriorating situation with increasing alarm, viewing the conflict not only as a humanitarian disaster and security threat but also through the prism of strategic competition and resource security. In early 2025, the newly inaugurated U.S. administration (following the 2024 elections) made the Great Lakes crisis a foreign policy priority. President Donald Trump, returning to office, declared the violence in eastern Congo “a very serious problem”, and signalled a more hands-on American role in resolving it. Washington’s engagement took multiple forms. Firstly, the administration ramped up diplomatic pressure on Kigali: Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivered stern warnings to both Rwandan and Congolese leaders, and in a notable move, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on an influential Rwandan government minister accused of abetting the conflict, as well as on the M23’s spokesperson and his business entities. These measures demonstrated that the U.S. was willing to name and penalise those seen as spoilers to peace. Several European nations similarly suspended aid to Rwanda during this period as a rebuke for its alleged role in the carnage.
Secondly, the U.S. sought to couple pressure with incentives. Sensing an opportunity amid Congo’s appeals for help, Washington explored a “minerals-for-security” deal with the DRC. In fact, a Congolese senator had approached U.S. officials earlier in 2025 with a proposal: Kinshasa would welcome increased U.S. investment in its critical minerals sector if, in return, Washington would help address Congo’s security nightmare in the east. This proposal aligned with U.S. interests in curbing China’s near-monopoly over Congo’s mineral wealth – a monopoly that American officials believed undermined Western supply chains for everything from smartphones to electric car batteries. In April 2025, President Trump dispatched Mr. Massad Boulos as his Senior Advisor for Africa (and unofficial envoy to the Great Lakes). Mr. Boulos – notably, the father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany, underscoring a blend of personal diplomacy – toured the region with the promise of American support. During a visit to Kinshasa on 3 April, Boulos announced that the United States was “in talks to invest billions of dollars” in the DRC’s mining sector and simultaneously “wants to help end [the] conflict” in the east. He indicated that U.S. companies would be involved and that any minerals agreement would be linked to peace: “There can be no economic prosperity without security”, Boulos emphasized, pledging that the U.S. seeks a “lasting peace that affirms the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the DRC”. This two-pronged approach – sanctioning Rwanda while courting Congo with investment – set the stage for Washington to take a lead in mediation.
Throughout April 2025, American diplomacy worked feverishly. Boulos shuttled between Kigali and Kinshasa, meeting both Kagame and Tshisekedi to hammer out parameters of an understanding. By mid-April, he had sufficiently narrowed gaps such that plans were laid for a high-level meeting in Washington. The concept of a “Declaration of Principles” was devised as a confidence-building measure – essentially a framework agreement that would stop the bleeding and create a roadmap for a fuller peace treaty. Significantly, Washington coordinated closely with Qatar and the African mediators, positioning the U.S.-led initiative not as a replacement of regional efforts but as complementary to them. Indeed, American officials took care to acknowledge the “incredible work” done by the African Union, EAC, and others in laying the groundwork for talks. The U.S. aim was to “energize these efforts” with its clout and resources, and crucially to bring President Tshisekedi and President Kagame’s governments into direct alignment on key principles.
By 25 April 2025, these preparatory efforts bore fruit. The foreign ministers of the DRC and Rwanda arrived in Washington, D.C., ready to sign the Declaration of Principles that U.S. diplomacy had helped draft. The stage was set for what many hoped would be a turning point after months of escalating violence. The path to this moment was paved through a mix of coercive pressure (sanctions and UN resolutions against Rwanda’s actions) and positive inducements (economic partnerships and face-saving dialogue). In essence, the U.S. managed to convene the parties by convincing each that they stood to gain: for Kinshasa, a chance to reclaim its east and obtain robust backing against rebels; for Kigali, a chance to address its security concerns (like the FDLR) through a negotiated process and to participate in regional economic projects with U.S. support; and for both, the prospect of Western investment to develop a war-torn region. The presence of Secretary Rubio at the signing, and the direct personal attention of President Trump (who reportedly followed the talks closely and later “felicitated himself on his role” in the peace process), underscored the high stakes Washington attached to this endeavour.
The Declaration of Principles: Content and Significance
The “Declaration of Principles between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of Rwanda”, signed on 25 April 2025, is an ambitious document that lays down the broad parameters for peace. While not a final peace treaty, it is explicitly designed to “pose[r] les bases d’un futur accord de paix durable” – to lay the foundations of a durable peace accord – between two countries “long opposed on the regional stage”. The declaration is concise but wide-ranging, centred on six major commitments agreed by both sides:
- Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity: Both Kinshasa and Kigali formally recognize the inviolability of each other’s borders and territorial sovereignty. This principle is crucial given that each has, in the past, accused the other of territorial violations (Rwanda’s incursions, and DRC’s tolerance of insurgents crossing into Rwanda). Reaffirming sovereignty signals that neither seeks the other’s territory nor will support secessionist movements.
- Addressing security concerns: The two states commit to take into account and address each other’s security grievances. In practice, this means the DRC agrees to intensify efforts to neutralise the FDLR and other anti-Rwanda armed groups on its soil, while Rwanda agrees to cease any support to insurgents like the M23 and ensure no Rwandan troops operate unofficially in the DRC. Indeed, even ahead of the signing, both sides vowed to “refrain from providing military support to armed groups” as an immediate confidence-building measure. The declaration also envisages a “joint security coordination mechanism” to combat armed groups and criminal networks – effectively a forum for the two militaries (and potentially regional partners) to share information and cooperate against the plethora of militias that plague eastern Congo. This could mark a revival of past collaboration (as seen in 2009’s joint operations) but under much clearer mutually agreed terms.
- Regional economic integration: A forward-looking element of the declaration is the pledge to promote integrated economic development in the region. Both countries recognise that beyond ending hostilities, a sustainable peace dividend is needed. The document speaks of building “new regional value chains” linking DRC and Rwanda, with an emphasis on involving the American private sector. The vision is to transform a zone of conflict into one of joint prosperity – for example through cross-border trade, infrastructure linking markets, and cooperative exploitation of resources in a transparent manner. Rwanda’s foreign minister highlighted this, noting discussions on creating value chains with U.S. investment in mining and other sectors. The subtext is clear: by intertwining their economic interests (and bringing in Western investment), the DRC and Rwanda can reduce the incentives for conflict and share in growth.
- Facilitating return of displaced persons and refugees: The humanitarian aspect is explicitly acknowledged – the declaration calls for facilitating the return of people displaced by the conflict. Rwanda currently hosts roughly 100,000 Congolese refugees who fled ethnic violence, some living in camps for over 25 years. Conversely, there are also Rwandan refugees (mostly Hutu) still in eastern DRC since the 1990s. Both categories are entwined with security issues – for example, genuine refugees often live alongside combatants. The commitment signals that Kinshasa and Kigali will cooperate with UN agencies to create conditions for voluntary, safe return or resettlement, which is vital for regional reconciliation. As Minister Nduhungirehe put it, “security, as well as the return of refugees” are first and foremost among the issues to be solved for lasting peace.
- Support for MONUSCO and regional mechanisms: In a bid to stabilise the situation, the declaration affirms support for the UN peacekeeping force (MONUSCO) and other regional forces/mechanisms present. This is noteworthy because MONUSCO has faced public anger in the DRC, with accusations of ineffectiveness, and Rwanda has at times been critical of the UN force’s mandate. By supporting MONUSCO, both governments are effectively pledging not to obstruct peacekeepers and to improve cooperation with them. UNSC Resolution 2773 had also “reaffirmed full support” for MONUSCO and warned against attempts to undermine it. Now the parties themselves echo that stance, which should ease MONUSCO’s work in delivering aid and protecting civilians. Additionally, support for “regional forces and mechanisms” likely refers to the EAC regional force and the Luanda/Nairobi processes – indicating this Washington initiative is meant to bolster, not supplant, African-led peace efforts.
- Negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement: Finally, the declaration is a roadmap to a final peace treaty. It commits Kinshasa and Kigali to work expeditiously on a definitive agreement to normalise relations and end the conflict. In fact, as part of the understanding, they set a deadline of 2 May 2025 to come up with a draft peace accord. This tight timeline reflects a sense of urgency – both sides are to maintain momentum so that the Declaration of Principles quickly matures into a concrete peace deal with specific terms of implementation. By agreeing to a near-term deadline, the parties also create a focal point for international support and pressure; all parties know that by early May the world will expect to see a tangible agreement. The declaration, in effect, is the skeleton upon which flesh must be put in the coming days.
The significance of these six axes cannot be overstated. They mirror the main contentious issues that have led to war repeatedly: territorial incursions, the presence of hostile rebels, mistrust and lack of economic opportunity, and humanitarian fallout. By articulating them jointly, DRC and Rwanda have, for the first time in many years, acknowledged each other’s legitimate concerns in a balanced manner. For example, the DRC gains Rwanda’s acknowledgment of Congolese sovereignty and a cessation of Rwandan meddling, while Rwanda gains DRC’s acknowledgment of Rwanda’s security concerns regarding groups like FDLR. Both sides gain an opening for economic win-win outcomes with international backing.
Another significant aspect of the Washington Declaration is the role of the United States as a witness and guarantor. Secretary Rubio signed the document as a witness, symbolising that the U.S. is staking its reputation on this process. In Rubio’s words at the ceremony, these were “serious commitments” by both sides, and the U.S. intends to “accompany [the] process and strengthen its partnerships with both countries”. He lauded the Declaration as establishing “a fundamental understanding of regional governance, security, [and] economic frameworks” needed to end the fighting. The U.S.’s presence provides a layer of accountability; as DRC’s minister Wagner noted, this initiative “reflects U.S. resolve to complement and support regional efforts” and “brings accountability” by drawing on hard lessons from past failures. The implication is that Washington will use its leverage to ensure both Kigali and Kinshasa live up to their word – whether by diplomatic pressure, economic carrots, or even the stick of reimposed sanctions if necessary.
Regionally, the Declaration has been welcomed as a boost to ongoing peace initiatives. Rwandan Foreign Minister Nduhungirehe explicitly stated that it gives “fresh impetus” to the African-led processes under the EAC and SADC, as well as the Doha talks mediated by Qatar. This reassurance is diplomatically important: it frames the Washington accord not as an imposed solution from outside, but as part of a continuum of peace efforts. The fact that Qatar immediately praised the Washington signing as a “positive and important step toward fostering peace and stability” shows the coordination at play – Qatar’s mediation with M23 fed into the larger agreement between states. Likewise, the African Union publicly commended the U.S.-facilitated declaration while stressing the need to keep aligned with continental frameworks. There appears to be an understanding that multiple tracks – bilateral DRC–Rwanda talks, direct government–rebel talks (e.g. with M23), and regional dialogues – must converge. The Washington Declaration, by covering state-to-state principles, creates a favourable political environment for those other tracks to progress. Indeed, just days before the signing, the Congolese government and the M23 rebels agreed to a ceasefire in Qatar, and all sides affirmed the goal of concluding a comprehensive peace agreement “as soon as possible”. Without the Rwanda–DRC understanding, any deal with M23 would lack the buy-in of its main sponsor; conversely, without a ceasefire with M23, a Rwanda–DRC accord would be a dead letter. Now, the pieces are coming together in a holistic way.
However, it must be noted that the Declaration of Principles is intentionally broad. One diplomatic source described the agreement as “very broad objectives to work towards”, to be followed by specifics in the final accord. In effect, it is a framework – important for alignment of vision, but it will require detailed negotiation to fill in the gaps. For example, how exactly will the DRC dismantle the FDLR, and with what timeline and international support? What verification mechanism will ensure Rwanda truly withdraws any covert forces and that M23 disarms? What form will the joint security coordination take (a task force, intelligence sharing, border patrols)? And on economic integration, what specific projects or agreements will be pursued – perhaps joint mining ventures or cross-border trade agreements? These are questions left to the follow-on peace accord. The brevity of the Washington Declaration thus cuts both ways: it eased consensus for now (since contentious details were deferred), but it means the hardest bargaining is still to come. As Nduhungirehe cautioned, “there are no shortcuts or quick fixes, and we have to do the hard work to get it done right, once and for all”.
The immediate impact of the signing in eastern DRC was a modest calming of hostilities. Reports from conflict zones indicated a tentative halt to major offensives as both the Congolese army and M23 observed the ceasefires urged by their political leadership. Nonetheless, skirmishes continued in some areas, and other armed groups (unaffiliated with either Rwanda or DRC directly) remained active. A local community militia in Masisi territory, the so-called “Wazalendo” (patriots), even seized a locality from M23 on the very day of the Washington signing – a reminder that numerous actors on the ground have a say in whether peace holds. Civilians in places like Uvira and Walikale remained fearful; one humanitarian worker in Uvira described rampant lawlessness in the interregnum, with retreating government-aligned militiamen looting and killing. These realities underscore that a declaration at the capital-city level, while crucial, does not automatically translate into peace on the hillsides of North Kivu. It is, however, the necessary first step to enable peace to trickle down.
From a geopolitical standpoint, the Declaration also signifies the United States’ re-engagement in Central Africa at a depth not seen in years. During the signing ceremony, Rubio made no secret of the fact that “a durable peace in the Great Lakes region will open the door for greater U.S. and broader Western investment”, calling it a “win-win” for all involved. He extolled American firms as “good corporate citizens” who would bring good governance and responsible supply chains for critical minerals. This language reflects an alignment of ideals and interests: peace and stability are cast as prerequisites for economic development, which in turn reinforces peace – a virtuous cycle. For war-weary populations in eastern Congo, such promises hold out hope of jobs and rebuilding once the guns fall silent. For Rwanda, whose economy is small and resource-poor, a stake in Congo’s economic future and inclusion in U.S.-backed projects provides a powerful incentive to maintain cordial ties. And for the United States, facilitating this outcome advances both humanitarian goals and strategic objectives, including reducing China’s dominance in the mineral sector. Indeed, the final text of the Declaration reportedly mentions the intention to bring “significant U.S. public and private investment” to the region. Already, Washington has been “in talks to invest billions of dollars in minerals in Congo”, covering resources like cobalt, copper, lithium, tantalum and gold. Rwanda, too, was in discussions with the U.S. about a potential minerals deal of its own. These parallel tracks suggest that a grand bargain may be at play: peace and cooperation in exchange for investment and shared prosperity. Rubio explicitly linked this to President Trump’s broader agenda, stating that peace in this region “will also help advance President Trump’s prosperity agenda for the world”.
International reactions to the Washington Declaration have been broadly positive yet cautious. The United Nations Secretary-General welcomed the accord and called for its swift implementation, urging all armed groups to lay down their weapons now that Kinshasa and Kigali are on a path to reconciliation (according to UN press statements). The European Union and key African states like South Africa and Kenya also praised the U.S.-facilitated breakthrough, though European officials privately noted that the real measure of success would be whether the violence actually stops and refugees can return home. China’s reaction, interestingly, was measured: Beijing’s envoy at the UN reportedly supported Resolution 2773 and echoed calls for ceasefire, while emphasizing respect for DRC’s sovereignty. Given China’s substantial investments in DRC, Beijing has an interest in stability, but it will watch warily any U.S. moves that could affect its mining concessions. As one Chinese diplomat subtly remarked, any external initiative should “achieve a ceasefire” and encourage regional solutions, implicitly reminding that the AU and regional countries should stay central. In African diplomatic circles, some quietly question whether the U.S. push is driven more by rivalry with China than altruism. However, as long as the outcome contributes to peace, such reservations remain muted. The general sentiment is that after years of conflict, a convergence of interests – American, African, Qatari – might finally be creating an opportunity for peace that none alone could have achieved.
The United States’ Role in the Region: Mediator and Stakeholder
The prominent U.S. role in brokering the DRC–Rwanda Declaration of Principles is a reflection of Washington’s evolving engagement in the Great Lakes region. Historically, the United States’ involvement in this Central African theatre has waxed and waned. In the 1990s, U.S. policy was marked by regret over failing to prevent the Rwandan genocide and a resultant sympathetic tilt toward the new Kagame government in Rwanda. During the First and Second Congo Wars, U.S. engagement was largely diplomatic and humanitarian – Washington provided aid to refugees and supported UN peacekeeping, but it refrained from direct intervention. In fact, some critics argued that the U.S. (along with the UK) was too accommodating of Rwanda’s security rationale, even as reports of Rwandan atrocities in the DRC emerged. Over time, as the magnitude of the Congo wars’ human toll became clear (millions dead from violence, disease, and starvation), the U.S. and other international actors pressed for peace accords and backed the transitional process that led to the 2006 elections in DRC.
One notable episode of U.S. engagement was in 2012–2013 during the first M23 rebellion. The Obama Administration took a firmer line against Rwanda’s support for M23: aid to Rwanda was partially suspended, and U.S. diplomats – including then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton – publicly urged Kigali to pull back. The U.S. also supported the creation of the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade that helped defeat M23. After that crisis, the U.S. appointed a Special Envoy to the Great Lakes (former Senator Russ Feingold) who worked alongside UN Envoy Mary Robinson to encourage regional reconciliation and the signing of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region. That framework, signed in Addis Ababa with 11 African countries and several international guarantors (including the UN, AU, and US as witness), was a pledge by regional states not to interfere in DRC and for DRC to reform internally. While the framework was well-intentioned, its impact was limited – it lacked enforcement teeth, and within a few years the signatories drifted from its commitments. Nonetheless, it established an important principle that neighbours should not support each other’s rebels.
Fast-forward to the present, and the Trump Administration (2025) has reasserted U.S. influence in a more transactional and high-profile way. President Trump’s personal interest in striking deals and “winning” at diplomacy appears to have extended to this African conflict, a somewhat unexpected arena for a president known to prioritise U.S. strategic and economic interests. In this case, however, strategic interest (critical minerals and checking China) dovetailed with conflict resolution. The administration’s approach combined hard and soft power: on one hand, targeted sanctions and strong rhetoric (the U.S. envoy Massad Boulos openly demanded “Rwanda should…withdraw all Rwandan troops from DRC territory”t, a blunt admonition rarely heard before from an American official). On the other hand, it offered carrots – a vision of American investment and partnership that would benefit both Kigali and Kinshasa if peace took hold. This dual approach positioned the U.S. as a unique broker who could reassure each side. For Kinshasa, Washington’s tougher line on Rwanda provided confidence that their grievances were finally being recognised by a superpower. For Kigali, the prospect of gaining U.S. economic ties and a say in regional security arrangements offered an incentive to cooperate that goes beyond what African mediation alone could promise.
Moreover, the U.S. brought convening power. Neither Rwanda nor the DRC would have found it easy to reject an invitation from the U.S. Secretary of State for talks, given the stakes of alienating Washington. The presence of Rubio (and the implicit backing of President Trump) gave both parties political cover domestically to engage in dialogue. Tshisekedi’s government, for instance, could tell its public that meeting the Rwandans in Washington was not a betrayal but a necessary step encouraged by allies to bring peace – especially after the U.S. publicly validated DRC’s complaints via the UN resolution. Kagame’s government, frequently sensitive to any implication of yielding to external pressure, could frame the Declaration as a constructive new conversation catalysed by a friendly U.S., rather than a concession extracted under duress. Indeed, Nduhungirehe thanked President Trump for “enabling a real change in the conversation” on resolving the conflict, suggesting Rwanda views the U.S. role as providing an opportunity to reset the narrative away from blame toward problem-solving.
Beyond this immediate event, the U.S. role in the region is poised to expand if peace efforts progress. Rubio indicated ongoing U.S. engagement: “Our government is focused on energising these efforts…we’re going to be in close contact with our African Union partners”. This implies a sustained diplomatic follow-up, possibly through a designated envoy or through existing channels like the U.S. embassies in Kinshasa and Kigali, and in multilateral forums. The U.S. has also signalled it will use “all diplomatic and economic tools to advance peace”, hinting that further pressure (or incentives) could be applied to any actor who backslides. For example, should elements of the Congolese military continue clandestine collaboration with FDLR extremists, the U.S. could sanction those officers or cut aid. Conversely, if Rwanda fulfills its obligations, the U.S. might restore any aid that was frozen and encourage international financial institutions to support Rwandan development projects.
In strategic terms, the U.S. is also inserting itself as a counterweight to other external players. The Great Lakes region has seen a diversification of external influence: China is the biggest economic player in the DRC, and it has sold arms or drones to DRC and Uganda that have been used in the conflict. The United Arab Emirates has been the main destination for smuggled conflict gold from eastern Congo, a trade fueling armed groups. Russia has been quietly making inroads, offering security training or mining deals. By stepping in visibly, the U.S. reasserts Western leadership in resolving African conflicts, something that also reassures European allies who have interests in the region (Belgium, the former colonial power in DRC, for instance, has strongly supported peace efforts but lacks the leverage to broker an outcome alone). The UK and France have similarly applauded Washington’s initiative, with French diplomats noting it complements France’s own efforts via the EU to call out the M23 crisis.
The U.S.’s economic stake is especially notable. As documented by the Council on Foreign Relations, American companies once owned large stakes in Congolese cobalt mines, but most were sold off to Chinese firms in the 2010s. Now, regaining access to those “critical minerals” (cobalt, lithium, tantalum, etc.) is almost a matter of national security for the U.S., given their role in high-tech and green technologies. The White House openly acknowledged that China’s near-monopoly in the DRC’s mining sector “hinders U.S. clean energy aspirations”. Thus, brokering peace also unlocks the potential for the DRC to diversify its partnerships. Notably, the DRC government had already shown willingness to recalibrate some of its Chinese mining contracts, seeking better terms – something that could align with increased Western participation. The Washington agreement’s emphasis on “responsible, reliable supply chains” for minerals hints that one outcome Washington seeks is to formalise mineral extraction in ways that bypass illicit actors and perhaps involve U.S. companies. If managed transparently, that could benefit Congo through fair royalties and community development, in contrast to the “systematic illicit exploitation” of resources that the UN Security Council condemned.
However, the U.S. must tread carefully. There is always local sensitivity about external powers profiting from Congo’s wealth – memories of colonial exploitation and the Cold War era meddling run deep. The U.S. framing is therefore crucial: it positions its investments as aiding local prosperity and “good governance”. Secretary Rubio explicitly said American firms would “ensure responsible, reliable supply chains…that benefit regional governments and our partners”. This is an implicit contrast to accusations that Rwanda and Uganda have long smuggled Congolese minerals for their own benefit, and that Chinese companies have operated with opaque deals favouring elites. By advocating joint economic projects, the U.S. aims to align Rwandan and Congolese incentives with its own: peace becomes profitable for all, whereas conflict only benefits illicit networks. It’s a diplomatic strategy of turning adversaries into stakeholders in a shared enterprise.
Yet, there is an understanding that U.S. engagement, while pivotal now, should eventually recede as regional capacity builds. Rubio acknowledged the work of African regional bodies and said the U.S. is there to “energise” and complement, not to impose its own solution. The ideal end-state for U.S. diplomats would be a self-sustaining peace architecture in the Great Lakes – perhaps an invigorated ICGLR (International Conference on the Great Lakes Region) mechanism that monitors border security and economic cooperation, supported by the AU and UN, with the U.S. and others in a supportive role. The U.S. likely does not seek a long-term mediating role (unlike in, say, the Middle East peace process), but rather to jump-start a resolution that regional actors can carry forward. In this sense, Washington’s role is that of a catalyst and guarantor of last resort.
Challenges and Prospects: Towards an “Irreversible” Reconciliation?
The signing of the Washington Declaration of Principles is a hopeful milestone, but it is only the beginning of a long road to reconciliation, as all parties themselves acknowledge. “Today marks not an end but a beginning,” said Foreign Minister Wagner at the ceremony, underscoring that the real work lies ahead. The coming weeks and months will test the political will of DRC and Rwanda to implement what they have agreed on paper. Several key challenges loom:
1. Implementation of Security Commitments: The most immediate test is whether both sides honor the cease-fire and withdrawal pledges. Rwanda must demonstrably pull back any forces it has in eastern Congo and sever ties with the M23. In parallel, the M23 rebel fighters need to be verifiably disarmed or cantoned. This is delicate – the M23 will be reluctant to disarm without a political solution for its members (such as amnesty or integration into the national army) in hand. Here, the Qatar-mediated dialogue between Kinshasa and M23 is crucial to tie up concurrently with the interstate deal. On the DRC’s side, the government must show it is taking action against the FDLR and other groups like CODECO or Mai-Mai militias that Rwanda views as threats. This could involve military action (with MONUSCO and possibly the East African force’s help) against hardline FDLR units, but also non-military measures – for instance, encouraging defections by offering DDR (disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration) programmes and repatriation to Rwanda for FDLR combatants. Already, there have been some gestures: earlier in March, M23 rebels handed over a group of captured FDLR fighters to Rwandan authorities as a signal of good faith. Such steps will need to accelerate. The DRC, which in the past hesitated or covertly allied with FDLR elements when fighting the M23, will now have to fully renounce that “enemy of my enemy” approach and treat the FDLR as much of a menace to peace as the M23.
2. Finalising the Peace Accord: The Declaration gives a framework, but negotiators must fill in details for the comprehensive peace agreement by the self-imposed deadline (early May 2025). Crafting this accord will be complex. It likely will contain provisions on monitoring and verification – possibly a third-party mechanism to verify that no party is arming proxies or that foreign fighters have indeed left DRC. The UN or AU could be asked to play a role here. It will also need to detail how justice and accountability are handled. Wagner, the DRC minister, pointed out that “peace and development cannot rely only on good intentions…They must be built on responsibility, clear commitments, measurable timelines, and consequences for non-compliance”. This suggests the DRC wants assurances that if Rwanda or any actor backtracks, there will be accountability. Conversely, Rwanda will want assurances that if ex-FDLR elements reemerge, the DRC will deal with them firmly. The accord may also reference border security arrangements, perhaps joint patrols or intelligence sharing to prevent cross-border insurgency. The question of refugees will require coordination with UNHCR; both sides might agree on a task force to assess refugee camps and a timeline for voluntary returns, with guarantees for those returning. Furthermore, the accord could outline economic cooperation projects – for instance, setting up a bilateral commission on trade and infrastructure. Ensuring that the agreement is balanced and perceived as such by both publics will be key. Any hint that one side “ceded” too much could spark backlash. It may therefore be necessary to involve opposition parties and civil society from both countries in consultations to build broad support.
3. Managing Domestic and Regional Politics: Both Presidents Kagame and Tshisekedi will need to manage domestic constituencies that are skeptical of the other. In DRC, decades of resentment towards Rwanda run high; many Congolese view Rwanda as the aggressor responsible for misery in the east. After Goma’s fall, anti-Rwanda sentiment spiked, with protests erupting in Kinshasa and elsewhere. Tshisekedi, who likely faced a contested election in 2023, has staked his credibility on standing up to Rwanda. For him to now make peace requires careful explanation to the Congolese public that this is a peace with dignity, not a deal behind their backs. The inclusion of language in the Declaration about sovereignty and withdrawal of foreign troops is vital for that narrative. He can point to UNSC Resolution 2773 and say: we got what we asked for – the world recognized our concern and Rwanda is now agreeing to respect our territory and take its troops out. On the Rwandan side, Kagame’s regime has its own narrative: that Rwanda’s security has been endangered by chaos in Congo and genocidal militias. For peace to be sellable internally, Kagame must show that Rwanda’s concerns are finally being addressed – hence the emphasis Nduhungirehe placed on tackling “violent ethnic extremism” and refugee returns. If the agreement yields concrete action against the FDLR, Kagame can claim a win for national security. Additionally, Kagame will be mindful of Rwanda’s important donors and allies (like the U.S. and UK) who will welcome this peace; it could improve Rwanda’s strained relations with them and possibly unlock aid that was on hold.
The regional context also matters. Neighbouring Uganda is a key player – it has historically both cooperated and competed with Rwanda in the DRC. Uganda also had issues with Rwanda (the two nearly went to war in Kisangani in 2000 over Congo). In the recent conflict, Uganda had troops in DRC ostensibly to fight the ADF (Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamist Ugandan rebel group) in a joint operation with Kinshasa. Uganda also has been accused by UN experts of giving some support to M23, though less overtly than Rwanda. A Rwanda–DRC peace will impact Uganda’s interests: Kampala would want to ensure that any economic dividends (like mining or trade deals) also include Ugandan connectivity. The U.S. will likely engage Uganda to support this process and ensure President Museveni is on board and not acting as a spoiler. Similarly, Burundi, which has troops in South Kivu as part of the EAC force and has its own rebel groups hiding in DRC, must be considered. The peace accord might need to be nested in a broader regional agreement where all neighbouring states recommit to the principle of not backing each other’s rebels – essentially updating the 2013 Addis Ababa framework with specifics for the current context. In this way, countries like Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania (as EAC chair, for example) become stakeholders guaranteeing the peace.
4. Handling Mineral Wealth and Ensuring Shared Benefits: One of the thornier underlying drivers of conflict has been the competition over eastern Congo’s vast mineral riches – from coltan and gold to the recently crucial cobalt. As detailed in analysis, Rwanda and Uganda have profited from the illicit trade of Congolese resources during the war years. There is a risk that spoilers – including rogue elements in armies, local warlords, or criminal networks – could seek to disrupt peace if it threatens their illicit profits. The Washington Declaration’s promise of integrating value chains and attracting legitimate investment is meant to counter that by creating legal avenues for resource trade that benefit all sides. But it will require robust reforms: improving Congo’s governance of mining (to curb corruption that “mainly favors China” or other external players at the expense of locals), formalising artisanal mining communities, and ensuring Rwanda’s role is above-board (e.g. as a transit/refining hub for minerals with Congolese consent, rather than smuggling). If communities in the Kivus begin to see tangible benefits – jobs, infrastructure, royalties – from peace-time mining, they will become constituencies for stability. Conversely, if the population suspects a peace deal simply allows foreigners to carve up their wealth (a common fear), it could breed resentment. Transparency and inclusion of local voices in deciding economic initiatives will be important to address this. The involvement of the U.S. and perhaps international financial institutions could help set standards for fair deals. For example, new mining contracts under the peace framework could be reviewed by independent auditors or include community development funds. The idea floated of using public-private partnerships with U.S. firms might raise standards, as these firms will be under scrutiny to adhere to laws like the U.S. Conflict Minerals Act and international due diligence norms.
5. Maintaining International Support and Patience: Peace processes require continuous nurturing. The diplomats and envoys (from the U.S., Qatar, AU, UN, etc.) will have to maintain a united front and patience as the DRC and Rwanda hammer out details and inevitably hit snags. It will be crucial that if there are violations or delays, external partners respond in a calibrated way – not by abandoning the process at the first setback, but also not by ignoring non-compliance. The “consequences for non-compliance” that Minister Wagner mentioned could range from snapback of sanctions to naming and shaming in international fora. On the positive side, milestones like the actual signature of a final peace accord (hopefully in early May) should be met with immediate support – perhaps donor conferences to fund reconstruction of conflict-affected areas, or debt relief gestures for DRC to free up resources for development. The UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO, which had been under pressure to draw down, might now be reinforced or its mandate adjusted to help implement the peace (for example, assisting with DDR of rebels, monitoring borders, or protecting returning refugees). International financial institutions (World Bank, African Development Bank) have signalled readiness to pour resources into regional projects if stability improves. Ensuring that pledges made – the “billions” spoken of – actually materialise will be a test of credibility for the U.S. and partners. In conflict zones, people have often heard grand promises that never translated into better lives, so delivering early peace dividends (like reopening roads, deploying police to secure towns, or starting to rebuild schools) can make a great difference in consolidating peace.
One cannot ignore potential spoilers beyond immediate stakeholders. The FDLR, for instance, fragmented and weakened though it is, might attempt desperate attacks to derail a deal that spells its doom. Similarly, elements of the M23 who distrust Kinshasa’s intentions could refuse to disarm, possibly splintering off to continue guerrilla tactics. The agreement must account for such eventualities – through enforcement or offers of amnesty that reduce the will to fight on. The role of civil society and local leaders is also key. They will need to foster reconciliation on the ground between communities (e.g. between Congolese Tutsis and other groups in eastern Congo who have been set against each other by the war’s ethnic dimensions). Religious leaders, provincial authorities, and grassroots peacebuilders should be mobilised to address grievances, dispel hate propaganda, and promote the idea that communities can again live together. This is in line with what Minister Nduhungirehe mentioned: eliminating “violent ethnic extremism” so that the region can be well-governed and secure for all.
Finally, a note on irreversibility: Can this process truly be irreversible? History provides caution – there have been moments of apparent rapprochement before, only for conflict to flare anew a few years later. What might make this time different is the constellation of interests now aligning for peace, and the exhaustion of war-weary populations. The sheer scale of the humanitarian crisis (over 6.5 million internally displaced in DRC’s east, and millions more affected) has created enormous pressure for change. As Wagner movingly addressed her compatriots in the east: “You have every reason to expect more than promises…You are entitled to actions that measure up to the suffering you have endured”. The leaders of DRC and Rwanda have publicly acknowledged that they cannot continue on the destructive path – “peace is not weakness, it is strength” and it must be “built on clear commitments”. There is a sense that fatigue with the conflict – combined with the lure of stability and prosperity – might finally outweigh the entrenched patterns of rivalry. The presence of the U.S. as a guarantor adds a layer of confidence that was missing in purely regional agreements. If Washington, along with African partners, can help keep the process on track, then perhaps this time the peace will hold.
In conclusion, the Washington Declaration of Principles is a bold attempt to turn a new page in DRC–Rwanda relations after years of bloodshed. It represents diplomacy at its most arduous yet necessary – finding compromise where there was once only accusation, and forging mutual gain where there was once zero-sum logic. For the diplomats and political leaders following this development, it offers a case study in peacemaking: the importance of addressing root causes (security fears, livelihoods, governance) while also managing immediate triggers; the value of external mediation that respects regional ownership; and the need for a multi-dimensional approach linking peace and development. The next few months will be critical. Cautious optimism is warranted, tempered by awareness of the formidable obstacles to overcome. But should the DRC and Rwanda, with support from the United States and other partners, succeed in translating principles into practice, it would not only transform their bilateral relationship – it could finally bring relief to millions of people in the Great Lakes region and unlock the region’s tremendous potential. In the careful, subtle language of diplomacy, one might say the prospects for peace are “promising but require sustained effort.” Or, as an African proverb puts it: “Peace is costlier, but it is worth the expense.” The hope in the halls of Washington, Kinshasa, and Kigali is that this time, the dividends of peace will indeed outweigh the costs of conflict, and that 25 April 2025 will be remembered as the start of an irreversible journey toward reconciliation and stability in the heart of Africa.
