An Institution at a Strategic Crossroads
Created in 1964 with an authorised capital of merely USD 250 million, the AfDB has since evolved into a USD 208 billion multilateral powerhouse comprising eighty-one shareholder states. During the 2021–2024 programming cycle alone, it approved commitments exceeding USD 28 billion, channelled primarily towards energy, transport and social-sector interventions. Yet, despite aggregate achievements, Africa still confronts an estimated infrastructure-financing gap of USD 1.3 trillion, widening precisely as global credit conditions tighten.
Since early 2022 sovereign-risk premia on African Eurobonds have risen on average by 400 basis points, forcing several members into restructuring negotiations. Against this background, the AfDB’s ability to maintain its AAA credit rating while scaling counter-cyclical lending has never been more consequential.
Politically, the Bank remains a barometer of continental solidarity: its capital structure assigns roughly sixty per cent of voting power to African members, whose heterogeneity renders coalition-building an intricate exercise. The presidential election is therefore not merely a personnel change; it is an inflection point at which Africa’s development-finance strategy, its capacity to mobilise climate capital and its leverage in global economic governance will be recalibrated.
Historical Perspective: Precedents and Lessons
Since 1964 eight individuals have served as AfDB president, their tenures often mirroring wider continental shifts. Early presidencies reflected founding shareholders’ dominance; by the late 1990s a coalition of smaller economies elected Moroccan economist Omar Kabbaj, demonstrating that strategic co-ordination among medium-size members could override financial heft. The 2005 election of Donald Kaberuka took eleven rounds and was resolved only after South Africa transferred voting weight to Rwanda in exchange for committee chairmanships. The 2015 and 2020 victories of Nigeria’s Akinwumi Adesina underscored the premium on linguistic agility and cross-regional networks. Two lessons endure: the double-majority rule makes a purely financial calculus insufficient, and prolonged balloting can unsettle bond markets as well as project pipelines.
The Electoral Framework: Legal Norms and Procedural Safeguards
The AfDB president is elected by the Board of Governors, composed of finance ministers and central-bank governors from each shareholder state. Article 36 of the Establishing Agreement requires candidates to be nationals of regional members and of the highest professional competence. The Rules of Procedure operationalise these criteria through nomination deadlines, vetting and electronic secret ballots. A candidate must secure a double majority—50.01 per cent of regional votes and 50.01 per cent of total votes—to be declared elected; if no one succeeds after five rounds, the Rules permit adjournment and, in extremis, the appointment of an interim president. The 2025 ballot will be held on 29 May during the Annual Meetings in Abidjan, maximising participation and transparency.
Profiles in Candidature: Comparative Assessment of the Field
The Steering Committee confirmed five eligible candidatures on 21 February 2025.
Amadou Hott (Senegal) blends Wall Street experience with African public service. As AfDB Vice-President he launched the USD 20 billion ‘Desert to Power’ initiative and, as Senegal’s economy minister, negotiated pandemic-era Eurobonds at historic lows. His manifesto pledges a tripling of the Bank’s green-bond programme and a guarantee facility for pension-fund co-investment.
Samuel Maimbo (Zambia), a former World Bank vice-president, focuses on internal efficiency. In a recent Brookings dialogue he promised to cut project-cycle times from twenty-two to fifteen months through AI-driven risk-scoring and to found an African Macroeconomic Modelling Centre.
Swazi Tshabalala (South Africa), until January Senior Vice-President and CFO of the AfDB, steered the 2023 Balance-Sheet Optimisation Plan that released USD 1.4 billion for climate projects. She advocates a 2027 general capital increase to expand non-sovereign operations to forty per cent of approvals while preserving concessional windows for fragile states.
Abbas Mahamat Tolli (Chad), former Governor of the Bank of Central African States, guided BEAC through a liquidity crisis and near-devaluation. His platform emphasises macro-financial stability and a new Fragility and Resilience Trust for conflict-affected states.
Sidi Ould Tah (Mauritania), ex-President of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, proposes a USD 20 billion Debt-for-Climate-Swap facility and greater use of Islamic-finance instruments. Interviews depict him as a consensus-builder bridging Arab and sub-Saharan blocs.
His candidacy gained momentum when Benin endorsed him on 6 May 2025.
Benin’s Endorsement of the Mauritanian Bid
Benin’s decision, personally conveyed by senior ministers in Nouakchott, was framed as recognition of Ould Tah’s pan-African vision, yet deeper motives can be discerned. With its own finance minister out of the race, Benin positioned itself as king-maker while counter-balancing Nigerian influence and reinforcing trade links along Sahelian corridors. The symbolic value of the endorsement may sway undecided ECOWAS members eager to project regional unity.
Voting Power and the Arithmetic of Alliances
The AfDB’s weighted voting structure translates diplomatic endorsements into hard numbers. The ten largest shareholders account for just over half of total votes; Nigeria leads with 9.1 per cent, yet bloc voting often trumps individual heft. ECOWAS collectively wields about one-third of total votes, while non-regional OECD members, acting in concert, can exercise a de facto veto by denying the aggregate majority. Early alignments suggest Tshabalala enjoys non-regional confidence, Ould Tah leads among West and North African members and Hott courts Nordic shareholders on a green-finance agenda.
Policy Platforms in Comparative Perspective
Consensus exists on crowding-in private capital, but pathways diverge. Hott champions a USD 5 billion Green Infrastructure Acceleration Facility backed by partial-risk guarantees. Ould Tah foregrounds debt sustainability through Climate-Swap instruments. Maimbo prioritises digitalised efficiency; Tshabalala seeks a rapid general capital increase; Tolli advocates a security-focused trust fund for conflict-affected states. At a recent Devex forum, candidates split on whether to channel Special Drawing Rights through the AfDB, with Maimbo and Tshabalala in favour, Hott sceptical and Ould Tah non-committal.
Institutional Governance Reforms: Accountability, Ethics and Digitalisation
An independent review in 2020 catalysed stronger ethics procedures. Building on that foundation, Tshabalala proposes real-time compliance dashboards, Maimbo blockchain-verified procurement, and Ould Tah a multilingual e-governance portal. Non-regional shareholders have intimated that support for any future capital increase will hinge on such measurable governance enhancements.
Stakeholder Perceptions: Civil Society, Academia and the Private Sector
Town-hall webinars hosted by the Center for Global Development drew substantial SME participation, with a majority prioritising disbursement speed over concessionality, implicitly favouring Maimbo’s platform. Academic papers from the University of Lagos advocate a new AfDB research hub, dovetailing with his modelling-centre proposal, while private-equity investors laud Hott’s and Tshabalala’s non-sovereign credentials.
Media and Public Diplomacy in the Campaign
Digital outreach has set new benchmarks; The Africa Report recorded a forty-five-per-cent surge in readership, and a CNBC Africa special with Ould Tah attracted 1.2 million views within forty-eight hours, signalling heightened public-diplomacy expectations for MDB leaders.
Bilateral Economic Context: Benin–Mauritania Synergies
Trade between Cotonou and Nouakchott has grown at seventeen per cent annually since 2019, driven by cotton exports and fisheries. The two governments co-chair the Sahel Alliance’s corridor working group and seek AfDB finance for the Abidjan-Nouakchott Coastal Highway. Benin’s endorsement therefore intertwines diplomatic symbolism with concrete economic incentives.
Regional Security Considerations and Development Finance
Jihadist spill-over towards the Gulf of Guinea has doubled insurance premia on project cargoes. Maimbo proposes Security-Adjusted Loan Pricing rebates; Tolli favours a Counter-Cyclical Buffer Facility; Ould Tah would integrate fragility assessments into climate-swap operations. For littoral states such as Benin, security-sensitive financing modalities are likely to influence voting choices.
Systemic Challenges Facing the Bank
Macroeconomic headwinds, climate-finance deficits and institutional agility constitute a triad of pressing challenges. African public-debt ratios averaged sixty-one per cent in 2024, constraining fiscal space even as the AfDB’s own funding costs rose. Meeting the Bank’s pledge to devote forty per cent of approvals to climate finance by 2030 will require innovative mobilisation beyond traditional concessional channels. The AfDB Secretary-General has already hinted that a general capital increase will depend on demonstrable operational efficiencies.
Beyond the AfDB: Continental Leadership Transitions and Strategic Synergies
Concurrent elections at the African Union Commission and Afreximbank offer scope for institutional alignment on digital trade and climate finance. A CSIS analysis portrays 2025 as a ‘pivotal year’ for Africa’s multilateral architecture, with AfDB leadership viewed as bellwether and catalyst alike.
Non-Regional Shareholders: Expectations, Conditionalities and Soft Power
Japan links co-financing expansion to greenhouse-gas accounting; the United States conditions capital-increase backing on strengthened whistle-blower safeguards; EU states seek alignment with the Global Gateway initiative. Candidates’ platforms intersect these agendas in varied ways, underscoring the diplomatic dexterity required to balance African ownership with donor conditionalities.
The Prospective Trajectory of the AfDB: Scenarios to 2030
Three scenarios present themselves. Under Incremental Reform, the Bank continues business as usual, meeting only sixty per cent of climate-finance goals. Under a Transformational Leap, a successful 2027 capital increase and securitisation of part of the loan book could triple lending head-room. A Stalled Transition, by contrast, risks ratings downgrades and retreat. The credibility of the incoming president during the first hundred days will shape which pathway materialises.
Critical Juncture and Collective Responsibility
The 2025 AfDB election transcends routine governance; it will determine whether Africa’s primary development-finance institution can retain strategic elasticity amid overlapping crises. Benin’s endorsement of Sidi Ould Tah exemplifies how targeted diplomacy can alter electoral geometry, yet the victor must still forge a grand bargain balancing climate urgency, debt sustainability, security challenges and governance reform. Regional and non-regional shareholders alike share responsibility for converting post-election momentum into measurable developmental gains. The opportunity is significant; the cost of failure, immeasurable.
