A senatorial agenda that embraces information security
The 21 August meeting between the president of the Congo–France friendship group in the Congolese Senate, Aristide Ngama Ngakosso, and the French ambassador, Claire Bodonyi, confirmed the operational roll-out of the 2024 memorandum’s roadmap. Beyond protocol, the signal is unambiguous: parliamentary cooperation is now anchored in an “information security” pillar serving institutional stability. This framing was corroborated by Congolese media and parallel readouts from Brazzaville. (Congo-B, 21 August 2025; ADIAC, 21–22 August 2025).
State-backed—and gendered—campaigns
Recent French official analyses document a rise in manipulation operations attributable to state-linked actors, with pro-Russian narratives and, more recently, Azerbaijani vectors; their objective is to fragment public opinion and erode institutional credibility. Paris has reinforced VIGINUM, the service dedicated to monitoring and neutralising foreign digital interference. (Ministry of the Armed Forces/VIGINUM, 17 March 2025; SGDSN–VIGINUM, report of 7 February 2025; Senate reporting relayed by Le Monde, 25 July 2024).
Within this environment, campaigns are also gendered: in September 2024, French courts convicted two individuals for a hoax targeting Brigitte Macron, illustrating how prominent women are singled out for toxic narratives. In Brazzaville, the President’s personal representative, Françoise Joly, has been subjected to sexualised rumours and unsourced storylines amplified on social media; several local and regional outlets documented these flurries, alongside denials and clarifications. (RFI, 13 September 2024; Afrik.com, 30 June 2025; Jeune Afrique, 15 December 2024; Congo-B, 8 August 2025).
Task forces and methods: a Franco–Congolese convergence
On the French side, VIGINUM structures a state response—network detection, attribution, counter-narratives—in liaison with judicial authorities and platforms. The “Matriochka” episodes and other hybrid operations have served as a proving ground for this doctrine. (Ministry of the Armed Forces, “Infox:…”, 2025).
On the Congolese side, regulation and oversight of informational abuses rely on the Higher Council for Freedom of Communication (CSLC), whose monitoring and awareness mechanisms are deployed during electoral periods. Added to this, since mid-August 2025, is an announced coordination with Kinshasa to organise alternating briefings and joint actions against cross-border disinformation, under the aegis of Communication Ministers Thierry Moungalla and Patrick Muyaya. (ODIL/Congo-Brazzaville brief; RTNC, 19 August 2025; Zoom Eco, 19 August 2025).
Why 2026 demands strategic vigilance
Congo’s presidential calendar is now outlined: voter-roll updates from 1 September to 30 October 2025 and a poll expected in March 2026, according to decrees published in early August and international press coverage. This sequence mechanically heightens the risk of electoral falsehoods, deepfakes and influence operations targeting institutions, media and female figures in public debate. (ADIAC, 9 August 2025; RFI, 11 August 2025; LSI Africa, 10 August 2025).
In this context, Franco-Congolese alignment is not a luxury but a procedural safeguard: sharing technical and legal indicators, rapid verification channels between authorities and newsrooms, and capacity-building for parliamentary interlocutors to curb the spread of malign narratives. Inter-senatorial cooperation provides the political framework for these exchanges, while specialised units—VIGINUM in France, CSLC monitoring tools and ministerial coordination in Brazzaville—supply the operational know-how. The objective is not to “over-communicate” but to restore predictability in the information space, and thus trust, in the months preceding the vote. (Congo-B, 21 August 2025; ODIL/CSLC; Ministry of the Armed Forces/VIGINUM).
Contemporary disinformation, often scaffolded by state apparatuses, thrives on polarisation and sexist imaginaries. An effective response requires an alliance of institutional, diplomatic and media actors. In that respect, the Congo–France rapprochement is an opportunity: it combines technical expertise, democratic ethics and parliamentary anchoring. Looking to March 2026, what looms is less a communications skirmish than a test of democratic resilience—and French support, assumed and transparent, is an asset for Brazzaville as much as a strategic interest for Paris. (Congo-B, 21 August 2025; RFI, 11 August 2025; Ministry of the Armed Forces/VIGINUM).
