Key Takeaways: FDLR and the Joint Offensive
The Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda signed an implementation agreement on 7 November 2025 to launch coordinated operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, one of the region’s oldest armed groups. The plan underscores an unusual moment of alignment between Kinshasa and Kigali, long at odds over eastern Congo.
Lieutenant-Colonel Octavien Mutimura, the FDLR-FOCA spokesman, immediately dismissed the accord. He insists the movement will resist “until Kigali accepts an inter-Rwandan dialogue and guarantees a dignified return for refugees”. For him, disarming without political concessions “is utopian”.
The joint push coincides with UNHCR-organised voluntary repatriations. More than 800 Rwandan nationals have crossed back since August, yet Mutimura accuses the agency of “playing Rwanda’s game” and of coercing some Congolese citizens into crossing the border.
Context: Two Decades of Intractable Insurgency
The FDLR emerged in 2000 from militia remnants implicated in the 1994 genocide. Sheltering among Congolese communities, it has survived repeated Congolese-Rwandan offensives, MONUSCO pressure and internal splits. Recent estimates place its manpower between 1 500 and 3 000, though leaders claim higher numbers.
Multiple peace drives have faltered. A 2001 programme disarmed fighters in Kamina, and public weapon burnings in Kinshasa were hailed as a turning point. By 2014, another 1 500 combatants handed over arms to SADC and MONUSCO, only for fresh units to form in the forests of North Kivu.
Operations Umoja Wetu, Kimia I and II, Amani Leo, Amani Kamilifu and Sokola II weakened the movement but triggered widespread displacement and civilian harm. Each time, incomplete reintegration gave the insurgency room to reconstitute.
Timeline: From Kamina to Mutobo
October 2025 saw 277 Rwandans repatriated through Rubavu, following a convoy of 532 returnees in August. These movements fit into a cycle begun in the early 2000s, when refugee camps were disbanded in a push to separate combatants from dependants.
On 7 November the Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission opened the 76th intake at Mutobo Centre, Musanze, enrolling 156 ex-FDLR members for a three-month civic and vocational curriculum. Kigali presents the centre as proof that fighters who quit will receive structured support.
Meanwhile, FDLR commanders report daily clashes with the Armed Forces of Congo (FARDC) and, more intensely, with the M23-aligned Armed Forces Coalition (AFC/M23) around Bwisha in Rutshuru. They claim recent engagements cost them “many men and matériel” but insist morale remains intact.
Stakeholders: Kinshasa, Kigali and the UNHCR
Kinshasa faces a delicate balance: cooperating militarily with Rwanda while assuring domestic audiences that national sovereignty is preserved. Government advisers argue the offensive answers a security imperative shared by border communities weary of FDLR incursions.
Kigali’s calculus is equally layered. President Paul Kagame views the FDLR as an existential threat and a political foil. By entering a formal framework with Congo, his administration seeks to legitimise cross-border action and to accelerate the repatriation narrative ahead of regional summits.
The UNHCR stands between competing accusations. Its officials underline that returns are voluntary and that Congolese citizens are never refouled. Yet rebel statements alleging coercion risk undermining confidence in protection mechanisms just as demobilisation centres reach capacity.
Scenarios: What the New Campaign Could Produce
In an optimistic scenario, joint FARDC-RDF patrols would isolate the FDLR core, prompting commanders to surrender through the Mutobo channel while refugees move under UNHCR escort. Such an outcome could free resources for stabilisation funds earmarked by the African Development Bank.
A bleaker trajectory would see combat spill into densely populated corridors, reviving displacement on a scale witnessed during Kimia II. Hard-line FDLR elements, squeezed by state forces and the M23, could fragment into criminal bands, complicating local governance.
A middle path remains most plausible. Limited gains against key FDLR enclaves could converge with intensified diplomacy. Mediators from Qatar and the United States are already urged by FDLR spokesmen to “press Kagame for inclusive Rwandan talks”. Whether that leverage materialises will define the campaign’s enduring legacy.
