Key takeaways
The eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is again under the microscope as a report from New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, produced with the Groupe d’étude sur le Congo, evaluates five possible exits from a grinding war. The timing is critical: peace talks between Kinshasa and the AFC/M23 are now underway in Doha.
Researchers outline outcomes that run from total rebel demobilisation to the granting of limited self-government in parts of North and South Kivu. One path mixes a Rwandan pull-back, a weakened M23 and a credible political process. Yet the study cautions that each scenario demands reforms that some belligerents may resist (Center on International Cooperation).
Negotiations in Doha
The Qatari-brokered dialogue gained momentum on 14 October 2025 with agreement on a ceasefire verification mechanism. Delegations are currently ironing out a prisoner exchange, the last procedural hurdle before they approach the roots of the conflict—land, identity and resource control. Mediators admit the road ahead will be long and fragile.
Despite that fragility, Doha has already provided all sides with political cover to test ideas outside the battlefield. The presence of international facilitators has also nudged parties toward written commitments rather than oral undertakings, a shift observers see as essential for any later monitoring system.
Mapping the Five Scenarios
The report’s first option is straightforward: the AFC/M23 lays down arms, reintegrates into civilian life and cedes territory to state authorities. Unsurprisingly, this outcome offers the quickest humanitarian relief but comes with the highest political price for the rebels and their alleged backers.
At the other end of the spectrum sits temporary autonomy for contested districts. Local institutions would gain regulatory power over taxation and security while Kinshasa retains sovereignty. Between these two poles lie blended models featuring phased disarmament, joint patrols or elite power-sharing inside provincial command structures.
Analysts stress that any scenario depends on simultaneous progress in three areas: credible security guarantees, revenue-sharing to replace the war economy, and an enforcement body able to sanction spoilers. Without that triangle, even the most elegantly drafted accord risks collapse.
A Special Authority for Kivu and Ituri
The compromise attracting most diplomatic attention envisions a Special Stabilisation Authority for Kivu and Ituri. This executive body would oversee peacebuilding funds, supervise reconstruction contracts and coordinate reconciliation programmes across ethnic lines.
Under this model the AFC/M23 would obtain a limited number of senior posts within the Congolese armed forces at the provincial level. Advocates cite precedents from Colombia’s 2016 accord and the Philippines’ Bangsamoro arrangement, where ex-combatants joined state structures while a parallel development agency tackled root grievances.
Supporters argue that folding M23 officers into the official chain of command could reduce defections and provide Kinshasa with better visibility over local units. Still, the report warns that without transparent vetting and budget oversight the Authority could become another arena for competition rather than a bridge to peace.
Why Some Actors Prefer the Status Quo
The study bluntly states that several stakeholders—within Kigali, Kinshasa and the rebel movement—may calculate that continued low-intensity conflict is preferable to reform. Wartime smuggling networks channel minerals out of the region, while military commanders on both sides benefit from discretionary budgets and patronage.
Ending hostilities would force a pivot toward civilian governance, anti-corruption audits and security sector overhaul. Each of those steps threatens entrenched interests. The authors therefore caution diplomats to watch for ‘time-buying’ tactics: protracted procedural debates, sudden demands for amnesty or incremental ceasefire violations designed to reset the negotiation clock.
In short, the political economy of war remains a formidable obstacle. Even the scenario combining a Rwandan withdrawal with a weakened M23 hinges on credible monitoring and pressure—from donors as well as regional organisations—to deter spoilers who view peace as a loss.
Calendar of Diplomatic Milestones
The next checkpoint in Doha will be formal endorsement of the prisoner exchange framework, tentatively pencilled in for the coming weeks. Only after detainees return home do mediators expect to table discussions on the Special Authority and revenue-sharing formulas.
Looking further ahead, the report recommends a 12-month timeline to test whichever scenario negotiators adopt. That period, it argues, is long enough to launch pilot projects yet short enough to keep momentum. A mid-point review at six months would allow course corrections if security indicators or humanitarian access deteriorate.
