BRICS Expansion Redraws the Chessboard
When BRICS leaders admitted five new members this year, the ten-nation club vaulted from an emerging-market forum into a potential rule-maker. It now stands for roughly a third of global GDP and almost half of humanity, giving the global South an unprecedented megaphone in debates over trade, finance and security.
- BRICS Expansion Redraws the Chessboard
- A Group Not Born Anti-Western
- Beijing and Moscow Press Their Advantage
- Washington’s Own Goals
- Swing States Hold the Balance
- Africa’s Vantage: More Than Pretoria
- Congo-Brazzaville Gauges Its Options
- Economic Diversification Opportunities
- Risks of a Consolidated Anti-Western Bloc
- Room for U.S. Re-engagement
- Possible Scenarios
- What to Watch Next
A Group Not Born Anti-Western
For most of its sixteen-year life, BRICS avoided confrontational postures toward Washington. Brazil cultivated strong trade with the United States, India deepened defence cooperation, and South Africa prized Western investment. The bloc’s early declarations centred on development lending, infrastructure gaps and incremental reform of Bretton Woods institutions, not abrupt geopolitical realignment.
Beijing and Moscow Press Their Advantage
Over the past decade, however, China and Russia have steadily nudged their partners toward positions more critical of U.S. primacy. Chinese firms displaced American ones as Brazil’s top customers, while Moscow leveraged cut-rate oil to court India after sanctions on Russian crude. Both capitals lauded South Africa’s rhetoric on “de-colonising” global governance.
Washington’s Own Goals
Successive U.S. administrations cite fair points: India’s hefty tariffs, Brazil’s ambivalence on Ukraine, and Pretoria’s abstentions at the UN. Yet recent policy swings—steep tariffs, public rebukes and selective sanctions—have amplified grievances. Deputy Secretary of State Chris Landau spoke of the “darkest point” in U.S.–Brazil ties, and relations with New Delhi are the iciest since 1998.
Swing States Hold the Balance
Brazil, India and South Africa are neither treaty allies of Washington nor automatic supporters of Beijing and Moscow. Their multi-alignment allows them to extract economic and technological dividends from all sides. If they drift decisively toward China and Russia, BRICS could accelerate de-dollarisation drives and expand alternative lending platforms, constraining U.S. leverage.
Africa’s Vantage: More Than Pretoria
South Africa is the continent’s only BRICS member, but its moves ripple across the region. The attraction of discounted Russian energy, Chinese digital infrastructure and New Development Bank credit resonates with middle-income neighbours. At the same time, U.S. market access, technology partnerships and security support remain valued, producing a delicate diplomatic calculus.
Congo-Brazzaville Gauges Its Options
From Brazzaville, the debate is pragmatic. President Denis Sassou Nguesso emphasises strategic autonomy, seeking investment for the Congo River corridor, forestry-carbon markets and downstream petrochemicals. While not a BRICS member, the Republic engages the group’s banks, has welcomed Indian agribusiness delegations and signed a recent yuan-denominated loan with a Chinese consortium, all while preserving cordial ties with Washington.
Economic Diversification Opportunities
If BRICS financing scales up, Republic of Congo infrastructure—deep-water ports, fibre optics to landlocked CEMAC states and green hydrogen pilots—could secure fresh capital. Simultaneously, U.S. firms exploring LNG and carbon-capture projects provide technology that BRICS lenders presently lack. Navigating both streams demands regulatory clarity and balanced debt management from Brazzaville’s technocrats.
Risks of a Consolidated Anti-Western Bloc
A more cohesive BRICS, dominated by Beijing and Moscow, could coordinate payment systems that bypass the dollar, eroding the power of U.S. sanctions. For African exporters, that shift offers hedging tools but also volatility. Should geopolitical competition sharpen, middle powers may face pressure to pick sides, complicating Congo-Brazzaville’s non-aligned stance.
Room for U.S. Re-engagement
Washington still holds cards: deep consumer markets, advanced defence technology and a record of swift humanitarian response. Targeted trade concessions, green-energy partnerships and diplomatic respect could reassure Brazil, India and South Africa without demanding exclusive alignment. Such outreach would preserve space for African partners to cooperate with all major poles.
Possible Scenarios
If the United States mends fences, BRICS may remain a diverse forum where agendas vary by member, limiting anti-Western coordination. Should estrangement persist, China and Russia could convert the bloc into a conduit for parallel institutions, spurring faster de-dollarisation. A third pathway—incremental issue-based coalitions—would keep swing states and Africa agile, albeit amid heightened complexity.
What to Watch Next
The November New Delhi Quad summit, tariff deliberations in Washington and upcoming BRICS finance ministers’ meeting will signal trajectory shifts. Congo-Brazzaville’s own engagement with the New Development Bank and its forthcoming sovereign-green-bond roadshow offer tangible markers of how smaller states exploit, or hedge against, a fluid great-power landscape.
