Drawing on recent reportage and analysis, the piece situates Abba’s return from retirement within broader shifts in Algerian foreign policy strategy. It explores how the France-Algeria rift, exacerbated by the expulsion of twelve French diplomatic agents from Algiers and retaliatory measures by Paris, reflects historical grievances, security disputes, and a clash of political narratives on both sides. Concurrently, Algeria’s engagement with its southern neighbors is at a pivotal juncture: initially positioning itself as a mediator and champion of regional sovereignty, Algiers now faces unprecedented friction with the Sahel’s new regimes, including a diplomatic rupture over a downed Malian drone and contested accusations of “hostile” acts. Through an analytical lens, the article links Abba’s profile – a seasoned ambassador and author on Algeria’s foreign policy – to the institutional recalibrations in Algiers aimed at navigating these crises. Ultimately, it portrays an Algeria seeking to assert its influence and defend its interests amid deteriorating ties with its former colonial power and an unpredictable geopolitical landscape in the Sahel, with Abba’s counsel poised to shape Algeria’s diplomatic response in this delicate balancing act.
A Seasoned Envoy in a Turbulent Era
By presidential decree dated 17 April 2025, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune appointed Mr. Amar Abba as Adviser to the President of the Republic for diplomatic affairs. This seemingly routine bureaucratic act comes at an extraordinary moment for Algerian foreign policy. The country finds itself at the nexus of two major diplomatic storms: a rapidly worsening confrontation with France, and a delicate, shifting engagement with the coup-led regimes of the Sahel. The recall of Amar Abba – a 76-year-old retired diplomat and intellectual – to the highest echelons of policy-making is widely seen as a response to these “particularly numerous and burning” dossiers that Algeria faces on the world stage. A diplomate chevronné (seasoned diplomat) who had been devoting himself to writing in retirement, Abba has been “called back by Abdelmadjid Tebboune to work on diplomatic files” that have multiplied in urgency in recent months. His appointment not only highlights the gravity of Algeria’s current diplomatic challenges but also signals a broader reorganisation within the presidency to strengthen Algeria’s hand in international affairs.
Abba’s extensive background makes him an apt choice for such a critical role. He is a career diplomat who rose through the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representing Algeria in key global capitals and institutions. Over nearly five decades of service, he held ambassadorships in countries as diverse and strategically important as Russia, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, and Tanzania. This portfolio places him among the elite cadre of Algerian envoys, with first-hand experience in great-power centres – Moscow and London – both permanent members of the UN Security Council. “It’s a professional diplomat with a long career, nearly 50 years… having served as ambassador in Russia and the UK, two key posts, which gives him the means for an informed reading of international affairs,” observed one international relations specialist, highlighting Abba’s recognised expertise in multilateral diplomacy. Such credentials suggest that Tebboune is seeking seasoned counsel to steer Algeria’s foreign relations through a period of unusual complexity.
Equally notable is the timing and context. The appointment was made as part of a réorganisation des services de la Présidence – a reorganisation of the Presidency’s apparatus – aligning with constitutional provisions on managing high state offices. In effect, Tebboune is bolstering his own diplomatic advisory team at a moment when “regional instability” is acute and as Algeria “seeks to reinforce its presence on the international and African scene”. This move also comes on the heels of the removal of a previous presidential adviser: barely ten days earlier, Tebboune dismissed a political adviser (a former intelligence colonel) in a shake-up of his inner circle. The implication is clear – Algiers is recalibrating its foreign policy machinery, likely elevating the role of experienced technocrats like Abba to navigate a fraught external environment. As a respected intellectual, Abba literally wrote the book on Algeria’s post-independence foreign policy (his 2022 tome La politique étrangère de l’Algérie: 1962-2022 surveys Algeria’s diplomatic principles and engagements). Bringing such a figure to the heart of decision-making “at a time when Algeria is looking to strengthen its international and African presence” indicates a deliberate strategy: to blend historical perspective with pragmatic statecraft in addressing current crises.
France and Algeria: From Rapprochement to Rupture
The first major context for Abba’s appointment is the deepening rift between Algeria and France, a crisis widely regarded as the most severe in bilateral relations since Algerian independence in 1962. In recent weeks, tensions escalated dramatically when Algiers and Paris engaged in tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomatic personnel, shattering a brief thaw and plunging the relationship into acrimony. On 13 April 2025, Algeria declared persona non grata twelve French functionaries attached to the French embassy and consulates, ordering them to leave within 48 hours. This was “an unprecedented measure since 1962” – never before in the post-colonial era had either side undertaken such a mass expulsion of the other’s diplomats. Algiers’ decision, presented as a sovereign act of self-defense, was explicitly linked to a controversial development days earlier: the arrest in France of an Algerian consular officer, amid a French investigation into a year-old kidnapping case.
For France and Algeria, whose modern ties have always been tinged by the legacy of colonialism and the War of Independence, crises are not new. Yet the current stand-off stands out for its intensity and the directness of the accusations exchanged. The immediate trigger was the French authorities’ detention of an Algerian consulate staffer in Paris on 8 April 2024, as part of a probe into the abduction of an exiled Algerian activist, Amir Boukhors – better known as “Amir DZ” – nearly a year prior. Boukhors, a social media personality and fierce critic of the Algerian regime, had been allegedly kidnapped and secreted away in a dramatic incident on French soil in April 2024. After months of investigation, French prosecutors charged three men – including an employee of the Algerian consulate in Créteil – with involvement in the abduction, on possible terrorist-related charges. To French authorities, this was a law enforcement matter: a grave breach of French sovereignty by foreign agents that had to be prosecuted impartially. But to Algiers, the spectacle of its diplomat being arrested “spectacularly and ostentatiously, in public, by services under the French Interior Ministry” was nothing short of an insult.
Algeria’s government swiftly denounced the arrest as a political provocation. In Algiers’ view, Paris had “violated the rules of diplomatic privileges and immunities” by hauling in the consular officer. More explosively, Algerian officials accused France’s hardline interior minister, Bruno Retailleau, of deliberately engineering the incident to derail improving ties. The crisis, one Algerian communiqué claimed, was “the result of a plot, a completely staged affair fabricated by the [French] Interior Minister, who not only initiated this case but also revived an eight-month-old file about an alleged kidnapping…instrumentalised with the aim of harming bilateral relations and the positive dynamic desired by the two heads of state”. In other words, Algiers believed that elements in Paris – personified by Retailleau – were sabotaging the recent rapprochement between President Tebboune and his French counterpart. Notably, just weeks before the expulsions, there had been gestures of détente: a telephone call between Tebboune and President Emmanuel Macron, followed by a visit to Algiers by Jean-Noël Barrot, France’s foreign minister, on 6 April, in an effort to “reconnect dialogue”. Any hopes of easing tensions were short-lived; within days, the Amir DZ affair exploded into the open, and Algeria retaliated harshly to what it saw as an affront to its dignity.
On 14 April, Algeria’s Foreign Ministry announced it was expelling the twelve French diplomatic agents – reportedly personnel linked to France’s Ministry of the Interior – in direct response to the consular arrest. Algiers cast this as a justified reciprocal measure to an “acte indigne” (“unworthy act”) by France. “Those 12 persons…were sovereignly declared persona non grata in response to the arrest in France of an Algerian consular agent,” the Algerian statement affirmed, stressing that the decision was its sovereign right. It pointedly laid blame on Minister Retailleau, holding him “entirely responsible” for the turn of events and warning that any further “action attentatoire” (injurious action) from him would meet with a “firm and appropriate response”. Algiers also lamented that this crisis erupted just when relations had begun “to de‑escalate” thanks to the presidential phone call – now undone by what they termed Retailleau’s “constant negative and distressing attitude” towards Algeria.
Paris, for its part, emphatically rejected Algeria’s version of events and moved to counter-expel Algerian diplomats. French officials denied any political agenda in the legal case, insisting the judicial process regarding the kidnapping was independent. On 15 April, President Macron’s office characterized Algeria’s expulsions as a “brutal degradation” of bilateral relations for which Algiers alone bore responsibility. The Élysée announced that France would respond in kind: twelve Algerian diplomats and consular staff in France were in turn declared unwelcome, and France’s ambassador in Algiers, Stéphane Romatet, was recalled to Paris for consultations. “The authorities algériennes are taking responsibility for a brutal downturn in our bilateral relations,” the French presidency stated, while calling on Algeria to “act responsibly” and resume dialogue. In public comments, Interior Minister Retailleau struck a defiant tone, deeming Algeria’s actions “inadmissible” and asserting that “France must establish a balance of power” in dealing with Algiers. He argued that France “has a habit of extending a hand” but that “if Algeria chooses escalation, we must accompany that escalation without fear”. Such rhetoric underlined Paris’s resolve not to be cowed, even as it acknowledged the unprecedented nature of the spat.
Thus, within a span of days, the France–Algeria relationship plunged into one of its lowest points in decades. Both sides felt wronged and both resorted to nationalist grandstanding. Algerian media decried a “manipulation orchestrated” by France’s far-right elements to undermine Algeria, while in France a chorus of voices – from editorialists to politicians – urged a firm line against Algiers’ provocations. What makes this crisis particularly consequential is how it enmeshes core interests and historical wounds. It comes on the heels of a series of “irritants” that had already strained ties since the previous year. In late July 2024, President Macron made a diplomatic U-turn by endorsing Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara – a direct challenge to Algeria’s longstanding support for Sahrawi self-determination. Algiers reacted furiously to this “cadeau de l’impérialisme français au Maroc” (“gift of French imperialism to Morocco”), immediately recalling its ambassador from Paris. That episode marked the opening of the current rift. As one analysis notes, Macron’s decision – driven by France’s desire to secure “juicy deals” for French companies in Morocco – deeply antagonised Algeria, for whom Western Sahara remains an existential regional cause. The Algerian regime, an historic backer of the Polisario Front’s liberation struggle, saw Paris’s tilt toward Rabat as a betrayal of previous neutrality and as a direct threat to Algerian interests, both ideological and economic, in North-West Africa. The fallout was swift: diplomatic relations between Algiers and Rabat had already been severed in 2021, and now Alger–Paris relations entered “turbulence” over the same issue.
That shock in mid-2024 was compounded by other disputes. France’s hardening stance on immigration – including a notorious episode in late 2021 when Paris slashed visas for Algerian nationals, citing Algeria’s refusal to readmit its deported citizens – remained a sore point. President Tebboune’s government had bristled at what it considered France’s disrespect of Algerian sovereignty and dignity in migration matters. Moreover, in November 2024 Algerian authorities arrested a prominent writer, the dual national Boualem Sansal, in Algiers, prompting outcry in France. Each incident fed a narrative of mistrust. By early 2025, a cascade of events – from the so-called “affaire des influenceurs algériens” (a crackdown on Algerian opposition figures abroad) to what Algiers saw as the “racist instrumentalisation” of a violent crime in France involving an Algerian suspect – had generated a toxic atmosphere. In one illustrative incident, a deadly stabbing of a tourist in the French city of Mulhouse was seized upon by Retailleau and others as evidence that Algeria’s failure to cooperate on deportations endangered French lives. Algiers angrily rejected such claims, seeing them as xenophobic scapegoating.
It was against this already tense backdrop that the Amir DZ affair ignited the current crisis. The expulsions and recriminations of April 2025 therefore represent not an isolated flare-up, but the culmination of a long-building storm. For Algeria, standing up to France’s “mépris” (contempt) has domestic resonance – the ruling establishment can rally nationalist support by portraying itself as the defender of Algeria’s honour against a former coloniser still prone to “arrogance”. Indeed, Algerian officials have doubled down, affirming their “determination to defend [Algeria’s] interests in the face of provocation”. The Foreign Ministry in Algiers framed its retaliation as ferme and justified, emphasizing that all expelled French personnel were specifically from France’s Interior Ministry – a not-so-subtle hint that Algeria views them as intelligence operatives or security attaches engaged in unfriendly acts. On the French side, however, even those who favour engagement with Algiers have been alarmed by the aggressiveness of Algeria’s posture. Michel Bisac, head of the Algerian-French Chamber of Commerce, voiced concern about the impact on the 6,000 French companies operating in Algeria and warned against letting diplomatic rows jeopardise economic ties: “We’re not going to write off four and a half billion euros of French exports to Algeria,” he cautioned, noting Algeria could easily replace French products with Chinese or Turkish alternatives. Such worries prompted calls in Paris to defuse tensions – after all, as France’s armed forces minister (Sébastien Lecornu) admitted, in the Sahel “we need good coordination between Algiers and Paris on the ground of military, intelligence or counterterrorism” efforts.
For now, though, coordination has given way to confrontation. The crisis with France frames one half of the challenge Amar Abba steps into. As Tebboune’s diplomatic adviser, Abba must help chart a course between firmness and restoration – advising how Algeria can uphold its prérogatives and historical narrative vis-à-vis France, while eventually finding an off-ramp from a spiral that serves neither country’s long-term interest. His own writings underscore Algeria’s proud but pragmatic diplomatic tradition: Abba has argued that Algeria strives to stay true to the ideals of its Revolution while adapting to evolving national interests and realities. Mediation, he noted, is one of the most known instruments of Algerian diplomacy. That ethos may now be tested in mending the Algerian-French rift. It is a delicate task – one requiring Abba’s deep understanding of both countries’ psyches and the broader international context. Notably, his appointment comes amid what one commentator called “a recomposition géopolitique” in the Maghreb, Africa, and the Middle East. Nowhere is this more evident than in the second arena commanding Abba’s attention: the Sahel.
Algeria’s Evolving Role in the Sahel: Aspirations and Anxieties
Parallel to its feud with Paris, Algeria is entangled in a complex dance with its southern neighbors in the Sahel – Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso – where military juntas have taken power and flaunted a new brand of anti-Western assertiveness. Algeria, which shares long borders with Mali and Niger, has historically viewed the stability of the Sahel as vital to its own security. In past decades, Algiers often acted as a regional arbiter: brokering the 2015 Algiers Accord peace agreement in Mali, hosting dialogues, and leading joint security initiatives such as the CEMOC (Joint Operational Staff Committee) with Sahelian states to combat terrorism. Algerian diplomacy towards sub-Saharan Africa, as Amar Abba and others have observed, has deep roots in Algeria’s post-colonial identity – from supporting liberation movements to promoting the doctrine of “Africa for the Africans”. Indeed, since 1962 Algeria has seen Africa as an “important axis” of its foreign policy, providing aid to anti-colonial struggles and economic development, in line with the slogan “L’Afrique aux Africains”. This legacy underpins Algeria’s self-image as a leader in the region, and Tebboune’s administration has signalled an intent to revive and bolster Algeria’s influence across the continent.
However, events since 2020 have put Algeria’s regional role to a stiff test. A wave of coups d’état swept Mali (2020 and 2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023), toppling governments that were aligned with Western counter-insurgency efforts and replacing them with nationalist military regimes deeply skeptical of France and eager to assert sovereignty. France, long the dominant external power in the Sahel, saw its position crumble: it ended its Barkhane military operation, was asked to withdraw troops from Mali and Burkina Faso, and in late 2023 had its forces and ambassador effectively expelled from Niger as well. This created a geopolitical vacuum – and an opportunity for other actors, from Russia (via the Wagner Group mercenaries supporting Mali’s junta) to regional powers like Algeria, to step in. Algiers initially appeared poised to leverage the moment. It presented itself as a champion of African solutions to African problems, pointedly opposing any foreign military intervention against the Nigerien junta after the July 2023 coup. President Tebboune publicly rejected a proposed ECOWAS (West African bloc) armed intervention to restore Niger’s ousted president, warning that such an action could ignite war on Algeria’s doorstep. Instead, Algeria offered its own mediation initiative: a “six-month transition plan” to restore constitutional order in Niger through diplomacy rather than force. In late August 2023, Algiers unveiled a six-point roadmap urging the Nigerien putschists to agree to a short timetable for civilian rule – much shorter than the three-year transition the junta initially declared. For a brief moment, it seemed Algeria might bridge a solution; Niamey’s military rulers reportedly “accepted a mediation” by Algeria, acknowledging the proposal even if they balked at the exact timing. This was Algeria in a familiar role: mediator, voice of restraint, and regional leader asserting the principle of non-interference by outside powers (specifically countering France’s and ECOWAS’s pressure).
Yet, despite these efforts, Algeria’s relations with the Sahel’s new regimes have not blossomed into the alignment one might expect from their shared anti-colonial rhetoric. In fact, by April 2025 Algeria found itself in a diplomatic rift with the Sahelian trio unprecedented in recent history. The most dramatic turn came over Mali. At the end of March 2025, a confrontation erupted when the Algerian military announced it had shot down a Malian army drone that had allegedly strayed into Algerian airspace near the border. Bamako’s version of events was starkly different: the Malian authorities claimed the drone was well inside Mali’s territory when Algeria destroyed it, calling the act a deliberate and hostile aggression. After an investigation, Mali’s government asserted with “absolute certainty” that the drone was downed by a “premeditated hostile action of the Algerian regime” on Malian soil. This triggered a diplomatic outrage. On 7 April 2025, the three junta-led states – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which had by now formed a loose alliance dubbed the “Alliance des États du Sahel” (AES) – issued a joint communiqué announcing the recall of their ambassadors from Algiers. It was a striking collective rebuke to Algeria, signalling solidarity among the Sahel coups governments against a neighbour they accused of overreach.
Mali’s language in justifying this move was scathing. Bamako condemned “the gravity of this unprecedented act of aggression” and denounced Algeria’s behavior as “hostile, unfriendly and condescending”. It wasn’t just about the drone; the incident poured fuel on a fire of accumulating grievances. The Malian authorities went so far as to accuse Algiers of supporting terrorist groups. In Mali’s words, Algeria was guilty of maintaining a “proximity with terrorist groups” in the border regions. This extraordinary charge alludes to long-standing suspicions in Malian military circles that Algeria, in seeking to manage the jihadi insurgency on its southern flank, might be in tacit contact with certain militants or tolerating them as a buffer – an allegation Algiers vehemently rejects. True or not, the perception in Bamako had turned toxic. Compounding matters, in January 2024 Mali’s junta had unilaterally declared the 2015 Algiers Peace Accord null and void. That peace deal – painstakingly negotiated under Algerian auspices to end conflict between Mali’s government and northern separatist rebels – was a jewel of Algerian regional diplomacy. Its collapse was a blow to Algiers’ prestige and a sign that the new Malian rulers no longer felt bound by Algeria’s diplomatic legacy.
The diplomatic estrangement did not happen overnight. As noted by observers, “relations between Mali and its large northern neighbour have continued to deteriorate in recent years”. There was an earlier quarrel in late 2023: in December of that year, following some undisclosed dispute (possibly related to Algiers’ efforts to reach out to Tuareg rebels, or another border incident), Algeria and Mali had already briefly recalled their ambassadors. Thus, by spring 2025, the trust between Algiers and the Sahel juntas was at a nadir. What is remarkable is that this occurred despite a broad convergence in their geopolitical narrative against France. All four governments – Algeria, Mali, Niger, Burkina – profess to be charting an independent course free of French influence. All have bristled at Western criticism of their human rights records and political systems. And all have shown interest in alternatives to Western partnerships (Russia, China, Turkey, etc.). Yet, shared slogans have not translated into an alliance; on the contrary, Algeria now finds itself somewhat isolated in the region, distrusted by the very regimes that many thought would be its natural allies in reducing French hegemony. As one analysis put it, “the regional power [Algeria] sees its relations deteriorating with the military juntas in power in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso”. This isolation was compounded by Algeria’s noticeable absence from – or exclusion by – new regional groupings. For instance, when Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso created the “Alliance of Sahel States” in 2023 as a mutual defense pact, Algeria was not part of it. And in 2023, Algeria’s bid to join the BRICS economic bloc (as part of its pivot to non-Western partners) was politely stymied, another indication that its grander ambitions were meeting limits.
Why have Algeria’s relations with the Sahel juntas soured, despite apparent common ground? Several factors are at play:
First, there is a clash of regional leadership and sovereignty sensitivities. Algeria prides itself on being the pre-eminent North African power and guardian of regional sovereignty. It has long considered the Sahel as within its sphere of diplomatic influence. The new juntas, however, are fiercely protective of their own autonomy and have shown they will not brook any perceived big-brother behavior from Algiers, just as they resist diktats from Paris or ECOWAS. The drone incident epitomized this: whether or not the Malian UAV strayed into Algerian airspace, Bamako interpreted Algeria’s military response as high-handed and violating Mali’s sovereignty – ironically the same charge Algiers often levels at France. The Malian junta’s decision to withdraw from the Alger-mediated CEMOC and to threaten international legal action over the drone downing demonstrates that they now view Algeria almost as a hostile actor in that context.
Second, divergent interests in counterinsurgency have bred mistrust. The Sahel regimes are embroiled in existential fights against jihadist insurgents. Algeria, having battled its own Islamist insurgency in the 1990s, adopts a multifaceted approach that includes fortified borders, intelligence dealings, and occasionally reaching out to insurgent leaders (for instance, Algeria has quietly mediated with kidnappers in the past to free hostages). Mali’s blunt accusation of Algerian “proximity” to terrorist groups likely stems from Algeria’s contacts with certain armed factions in northern Mali – contacts Algeria views as pragmatic but Mali’s junta views as connivance behind its back. Furthermore, Algeria maintains relationships with Tuareg rebel groups that Mali’s army distrusts. With the Algiers Accord discarded, Algiers’ ongoing dialogue with those rebels might appear to Bamako as undermining Mali’s unity – another source of tension.
Third, there is an ideological difference in the nature of the regimes. While Algeria’s system is authoritarian with a civilian façade dominated by a longstanding establishment (often with military behind the scenes), it still operates within some constitutional norms and multilateral engagements. The Sahel juntas, by contrast, are revolutionary regimes in the sense of having seized power extra-legally and pursuing radical policy shifts. They may perceive Algeria’s calls for quick transitions or its adherence to certain international principles as unsympathetic to their survival. Notably, Algeria’s six-month transition proposal for Niger, though intended to avert war, implicitly pressed the Nigerien junta to surrender power far sooner than it wanted – something that likely caused friction with Niamey (indeed, the Nigerien junta ultimately rejected the 6-month timeline as too short). Similarly, Algeria’s insistence on non-interference cuts both ways: it opposed ECOWAS intervention in Niger, but it also implicitly expects the juntas not to take actions that threaten Algeria’s security (like flying drones near its border) or regional stability. Balancing these expectations has proved tricky.
Lastly, external players complicate Algeria’s Sahel calculus. Russia’s influence via Wagner in Mali (and to a lesser extent its diplomatic courtship of Burkina and Niger) means Algiers is not the only game in town for the juntas. Indeed, the Malian regime seems to lean more on Moscow (and perhaps Ankara) for support than on Algiers. There is a subtle competition: Algeria, while friendly with Russia, may not welcome an expansive Russian footprint right on its border either. But its leverage is limited if the juntas see Russia as their primary security partner now. Moreover, the Western countries, though ousted, still seek Algeria’s cooperation in counter-terrorism (France has openly said it “needs” Algeria in that domain). This places Algiers in a somewhat awkward middle position between the West and the Sahel regimes – potentially pleasing neither side fully.
In sum, Algeria’s ambitions in the Sahel – to be a regional stabiliser and leader of an “African-led” security framework – have encountered stark realities. Instead of spearheading a new anti-colonial alignment, Algiers is scrambling to mend fences with neighbors who accuse it of hostility. Algerian officials were reportedly consternés (dismayed) by the triple ambassador recall in April 2025. The Foreign Ministry in Algiers issued statements rejecting Mali’s allegations and expressing surprise at the juntas’ démarche, indicating Algeria considered itself wrongly maligned. There is likely an effort behind the scenes to re-open channels; Algeria, for instance, has historically strong ties with Niger’s military (many Nigerien officers trained in Algeria). It may yet find common cause with Niamey or Ouagadougou on certain issues. However, the current picture is one of Algeria being diplomatically encircled in the Sahel, at least temporarily.
A New Alignment or a Balancing Act? Algeria between Two Crises
The twin crises – with France in the north and with the Sahel states in the south – place Algeria in a challenging strategic position. At first glance, they might seem unrelated; one is a bilateral spat rooted in colonial history and contemporary political frictions, the other a regional realignment amid security turmoil. Yet they are interlinked in important ways, and Algeria’s response under President Tebboune (and Adviser Abba’s counsel) will hinge on navigating their interconnections.
One common thread is Algeria’s drive for assertive independence in foreign policy. In both the France and Sahel arenas, Algiers is asserting what it sees as its sovereign rights and refusing to be dictated to by others’ agendas. Whether defending against what it calls French “attacks” on its dignity, or pushing back against Mali’s accusations, Algeria’s rhetoric emphasizes sovereignty, reciprocity, and dignity. As the Algerian Foreign Ministry put it regarding France, Algeria will not let an “inadmissible and inqualifiable” development pass without consequences. And in the Sahel context, Algeria equally bristles at any suggestion it needs to justify its actions to its neighbours. This posture resonates domestically – it projects strength and a reclamation of Algeria’s post-colonial agency. Indeed, some analysts view Tebboune’s hard line with France as partly aimed at bolstering his domestic legitimacy, which has been shaky since the contested 2019 election and the extinguishing of the Hirak protest movement. “Tebboune could be attempting, through negotiations around the open diplomatic crisis with France, to reposition himself as a major regional actor and to shore up his popularity with his electorate,” notes one commentary. Standing up to France, after all, has political currency in Algeria, tapping into a wellspring of national pride.
At the same time, Algeria’s confrontational stance carries risks, so a balance must be struck. The appointment of Amar Abba can be seen as an effort to inject seasoned judgment into this balancing act. Abba’s long experience with Western capitals may prove invaluable in managing the France dossier – knowing when to signal openness to dialogue even amid public broadsides. Likewise, his understanding of African diplomacy and the principle of mediation could help Algeria find a path to de-escalate with Mali and its allies, if that is what Algiers decides is necessary. Notably, Abba has extolled “pragmatism” as essential for remaining true to Algeria’s ideals while adapting to reality. This pragmatism may counsel that Algeria not burn all bridges. Already, despite the fiery rhetoric, Algerian and French officials have left some doors ajar. The Élysée’s statement, while blaming Algeria, also appealed for a resumption of dialogue and for Algeria to show responsibility. Algeria’s own messaging, beyond the blaming of Retailleau, hinted that the crisis was sparked by certain actors and not a wholesale rejection of ties – implying that if those “provocations” ceased, relations could be salvaged. Both countries have much to lose from a prolonged estrangement: economic links, migration cooperation, and security collaboration against jihadism, to name a few areas. There are reports of backchannel communications continuing despite the public feud. It would likely fall to figures like Abba to structure any behind-the-scenes rapprochement. As a former ambassador in Europe and an author who has reflected on Franco-Algerian diplomacy over decades, he is uniquely positioned to advise Tebboune on calibrating Algeria’s next steps – how to extract concessions or apologies from France perhaps, yet avoid a permanent rupture.
In the Sahel theatre, Algeria’s strategic goals also require finesse. Despite current ill will, Algeria does not want a permanently hostile Mali-Niger-Burkina bloc on its borders, nor does it want those countries to become failed states that could export chaos northwards. Algeria still shares an interest with the Sahel states in combating terrorism and trafficking. Additionally, Algeria competes with Morocco for influence in Africa; if Algeria’s relations with the Sahel remain poor, it cedes ground to rivals (Morocco has quietly been improving ties with those same countries, even obtaining their support on Western Sahara in some cases). Therefore, one can anticipate Algerian diplomacy attempting a corrective course with the Sahel juntas. Signs of this “diplomatic assertiveness” are already visible – not in aligning with the juntas unconditionally, but in proactively shaping regional outcomes. For example, Algeria has leveraged global fora to gain support for its positions: it secured backing in the African Union for its stance against foreign intervention in Niger. It also continues to offer itself as a mediator where possible; Algerian envoys have maintained contact with Niger’s military government and with factions in Libya and Chad, positioning Algeria as a key interlocutor in Saharan-Sahelian affairs. Abba’s role may involve formulating proposals or dialogue initiatives to rebuild trust with Mali’s rulers, possibly revisiting some form of the 2015 peace framework under new terms, or at least preventing further escalation like military incidents.
Beyond crisis management, Abba’s appointment and these simultaneous disputes hint at broader shifts in Algerian diplomacy. Under Tebboune, especially in the past year, Algeria has shown an increasing willingness to wield its diplomatic leverage more openly and even aggressively. This is a departure from some earlier eras where Algiers preferred quiet diplomacy and avoided public spats. Now, Algeria is putting forth bold demands and conditions on the international stage. For instance, amid the quarrel with Paris, Algeria has revived an issue long kept on the backburner: it is pressing France to finally address the legacy of nuclear tests conducted in the Algerian Sahara in the 1960s. Between 1960 and 1966, France carried out 17 nuclear detonations in southern Algeria (some even after independence, under accords with the new Algerian state). The sites remain contaminated, and Algeria insists that France has a moral and legal duty to fund and facilitate the clean-up of radioactive waste that still exposes local populations to harm. By tying this historical grievance to the current diplomatic agenda, Algeria is broadening the scope of discussion – effectively reminding France and the world of unfinished business from the colonial era. Similarly, Algeria is seeking to renegotiate a 2001 association agreement with the European Union, which it views as economically unfavorable. Algiers wants easier export of its products – cement, minerals, agriculture – to Europe, beyond the hydrocarbons for which it is already the EU’s third-largest gas supplier. This push shows an assertiveness in trade diplomacy that aligns with Algeria’s recent efforts to diversify partnerships (for instance, deepening energy ties with Italy and Turkey).
In parallel, Algeria’s tilt towards new global alliances is evident. Although its attempt to join BRICS in 2023 did not immediately succeed, Algiers has not given up on that path. It continues to strengthen links with China (a major investor in Algerian infrastructure and purchaser of Algerian oil) and Russia (Algeria’s primary arms supplier and a long-standing political ally). The diplomatic messaging is that Algeria will not remain beholden to its traditional European partners if disrespected; it has other options. Indeed, one reason cited by analysts for France’s controversial choice to side with Morocco on Western Sahara was that Algeria had not been “open” enough to French investment, instead opting for “protectionism and opening to other competing partners like Italy, China…”. In a sense, Algeria has been diversifying its strategic portfolio, and Tebboune’s foreign-policy pivots reflect that. Abba’s writings underscore that while Algeria has core principles, it must adapt to “realities around us” and increasingly account for national interest. His very career – straddling East and West, having served in Moscow during the Soviet era and in London – embodies Algeria’s non-aligned ethos and pragmatic balance. As adviser, he may champion a foreign policy that continues courting emerging powers and African solidarity, even as Algeria manages its contention with France.
For President Tebboune’s government, success on these fronts would mean reaping the benefits of its bold strategy without suffering the losses of isolation. The tightrope is evident. In France, some voices urge Macron to “ne rien concéder à Alger” – to concede nothing to Algeria, advocating a tough stance that could prolong the standoff. In the Sahel, the volatility of the juntas means Algeria could be dragged into further incidents if misunderstandings persist. An ideal outcome for Algiers would be to gradually restore a working relationship with France (perhaps after French domestic politics move past the current hardline phase), and to re-engage the Sahel states through security or economic incentives (for example, offering development aid or border security cooperation that the cash-strapped juntas would welcome). Algeria has signalled it wants stability above all: Tebboune repeatedly emphasises that Algeria’s overarching principle is non-ingérence (non-interference) but with active diplomacy to resolve conflicts. This principle was evident in Algeria’s stance on Niger – opposing intervention while offering mediation. It is likely to remain Algeria’s refrain.
Amar Abba and the Future of Algerian Diplomacy
Amar Abba’s appointment as diplomatic adviser, coming at a juncture of high stakes and high tensions, underscores a pivotal evolution in Algeria’s diplomatic posture. It reflects President Tebboune’s recognition that the country’s foreign policy challenges have reached a level of complexity that demands both historical insight and deft strategic planning. Abba, with his decades of experience and intimate knowledge of Algeria’s diplomatic doctrines, is now entrusted with helping chart a course through choppy waters.
His role will be to assist Tebboune in “le suivi et l’orientation des grands dossiers internationaux” – monitoring and guiding Algeria’s big international files – at a time when those files are on fire. The France-Algeria estrangement, if mishandled, could undo years of painstaking (if slow) reconciliation efforts and harm both economies; if managed wisely, however, it could lead to a frank new understanding that addresses perennial disputes (from war-time memories to visas and security cooperation) in a more balanced way. Similarly, Algeria’s fraught relations with Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso could, if left to unravel, imperil regional security and diminish Algeria’s regional clout; but if Algeria can repair trust, it may reassert itself as an indispensable partner in any durable solution to the Sahel’s crises – a position that aligns with its ambition to be seen as a pillar of African stability and not just a peripheral player.
Broader institutional shifts are already underway in service of these goals. The restructuring at the Presidency – effectively elevating the foreign policy brain trust directly under Tebboune – suggests a more centralised and assertive diplomatic decision-making process. It harks back to the era of President Houari Boumédiène in the 1970s or Abdelaziz Bouteflika (himself a former Foreign Minister) in the 2000s, when Algeria’s foreign policy was tightly run from the presidential palace and aimed at projecting influence beyond Algeria’s immediate borders. Tebboune, who lacks the revolutionary pedigree of Boumédiène or the personal diplomatic experience of Bouteflika, appears to be compensating by surrounding himself with veteran talent like Abba. Notably, he also brought back Ahmed Attaf, another experienced diplomat, as Foreign Minister in 2023 – part of the same trend of relying on seasoned figures to execute his international agenda (Attaf is tagged alongside Abba in coverage of these changes). The synergy between Abba’s advisory role and Attaf’s ministerial role could revitalize Algeria’s Foreign Ministry, which some critics have lately dubbed an “institution morte” (dead institution) suffering from improvisation and incoherence in recent years. An observer commenting on Abba’s appointment cynically noted that “to bring an institution back to life, it takes more than [Abba’s] qualities”, pointing to deeper issues in governance. Nonetheless, reinjecting professionalism and historical continuity into the diplomatic corps is a start.
On the international stage, Algeria under Tebboune – and guided by Abba – is likely to continue walking a fine line between confrontation and conciliation. The coming months will test whether the tough measures taken were posturing to establish a position of strength or the beginning of a longer estrangement. Already, by late April 2025, there were signs that cooler heads may prevail. French and Algerian officials quietly indicated willingness to keep communication channels open, and media on both sides have started debating face-saving formulas. Diplomacy often follows such cycles of crisis and negotiation. Algeria has made its point with France; Abba’s task will be to help translate that into diplomatic gains, perhaps by pushing France to acknowledge certain Algerian concerns (for example, greater cooperation in prosecuting crimes like the 1990s assassination of monks in Algeria, or French acknowledgment of the nuclear issue and colonial-era archives – longstanding requests of Algeria). In the Sahel, Abba’s counsel might be geared towards a diplomatic charm offensive: sending special envoys to Bamako and Niamey, proposing security pacts that respect those countries’ sovereignty while rebuilding collaboration, and leveraging multilateral forums (the African Union, the Arab League, the UN) to encourage reconciliation. His own emphasis on the value of the Algerian diaspora as a soft power asset is relevant too – Algerian communities abroad, especially in Europe, can be bridges of understanding; though in the France case, diaspora activism was a flashpoint (the Amir DZ case), Algeria could aim to better harness or manage these communities’ role in bilateral relations.
In the final analysis, Algeria stands at a crossroads. The simultaneous spats with a major world power and with neighbouring states are not a position any country relishes, but they also present an opportunity for Algeria to redefine its diplomacy. By confronting France, Algeria may solidify a more equal footing in that long-imbalanced relationship – if the confrontation leads to genuine dialogue about grievances. By engaging the Sahel on its own terms, Algeria could either forge a new cooperative security architecture among regional states or risk ceding the field to external players and rival influences. The role of Amar Abba will be pivotal in advising which pathways to take. As a figure who straddles the revolution-era ideals and the modern realities of globalization, he embodies the duality of Algerian diplomacy: principled but pragmatic. His return from retirement to the halls of power, as Jeune Afrique noted, comes when Algeria’s diplomatic files are particularly numerous and burning. With his help, President Tebboune aims to douse the fires – or at least contain them – and steer Algeria toward what Algiers has always sought: respect as an equal on the world stage, and peace and stability in its own neighbourhood. The coming period will reveal whether Algeria’s bold moves in 2025 will translate into diplomatic renaissance or further entrenchment of divides. For now, one thing is clear: Algerian diplomacy is in full motion, recalibrating under new and experienced guidance, determined to turn crises into opportunities for asserting the country’s regional leadership and safeguarding its sovereignty in an era of uncertainty.
