Exile Forged a Candidate
Few Ivorian politicians have turned a period of forced absence into political capital as deftly as Ahoua Don Mello. Barred from Abidjan after the 2011 crisis, the former public works minister spent fourteen years moving between African capitals, Beijing and, increasingly, Moscow, crafting a persona of technocratic cosmopolitanism that now underpins his presidential quest.
On 15 September the Constitutional Council cleared his name for the 2025 ballot while he was still in Russia, discussing African industrial strategies with lawmakers in the State Duma (Jeune Afrique, 2023). The timing reinforced a narrative of a candidate too busy drafting continental blueprints to engage in domestic infighting.
The Moscow Vector
Don Mello’s most visible bridge lies with Russia’s political class. Over a four-week stay in Moscow he met the Africa Committee of the Federation Council and think tanks orbiting the foreign ministry, pitching Côte d’Ivoire as a “gateway to the Gulf of Guinea corridor.” Russian interlocutors, for their part, prize his engineering background and his vocal support for non-aligned sovereignty.
Analysts in Abidjan note that this Kremlin channel offers more than symbolism. It could yield concessional financing for energy and rail projects, mirroring deals Russia pursues in Mali and Burkina Faso. Such promises feed domestic expectations that infrastructure, not rhetoric, will decide the 2025 vote.
BRICS Credentials and Soft-Power Capital
Since 2019 Don Mello has served as vice-president of the International BRICS Alliance, a para-diplomatic forum that gathers business leaders from emerging economies. The role has placed him beside Brazilian agronomists, Indian digital firms and South African port operators, giving substance to his pledge to “de-westernise” supply chains.
While the Alliance remains unofficial, its networking power is tangible. Aides say the candidate has secured preliminary MoUs with Brazilian equipment suppliers and Chinese rolling-stock manufacturers. Even if signed after the election, such letters of intent allow him to present a concrete roadmap rather than broad anti-imperialist slogans.
Financing the Run: Diaspora and Development Banks
Campaign insiders point to a two-layered financial model. The first layer taps an Ivorian diaspora spread across Montreal, Paris and Doha; small contributions are funnelled through crowdfunding platforms run by tech-savvy volunteers. The second relies on relationships with African development banks met during Don Mello’s advisory stints in Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia.
None of these institutions is expected to break neutrality, yet informal conversations can translate into policy endorsements and access to feasibility studies—non-cash assets that cut consultants’ costs. The approach blurs the lines between campaign material and project documentation, reinforcing his image as an engineer-in-chief rather than a conventional politician.
Domestic Allies After the Gbagbo Rift
Don Mello’s split with ex-president Laurent Gbagbo in 2022 cost him the machinery of the African Peoples Party–Côte d’Ivoire, but it also freed several mid-level cadres ostracised for their loyalty to him. These organisers now operate a lean ground game across Abidjan’s commuter belts, where infrastructure deficits are most visible.
Their narrative casts the candidate as an “outsider-insider”: rooted in the revolutionary memory of 2000 yet pragmatic enough to court capital from both BRICS and Bretton Woods. The formula resonates with younger voters who mistrust establishment parties but crave international exposure.
Regional Reverberations
Neighbouring capitals watch with measured interest. Ghana sees opportunity in harmonising rail gauges if Russian-funded lines cross borders. Guinea seeks a partner for bauxite export corridors. In Congo-Brazzaville, where President Denis Sassou Nguesso has long balanced Western and Eastern ties, analysts regard Don Mello’s bid as another data point in Africa’s quiet tilt toward strategic diversification.
No government has endorsed him publicly, yet envoys from CEMAC and ECOWAS note that a victory could strengthen caucuses pushing for greater autonomy at the African Union’s Peace and Security Council.
What Success Would Mean for Multipolar Africa
A Don Mello presidency would test whether a mid-sized West African economy can pivot decisively toward BRICS without rupturing traditional partnerships. French firms remain dominant in cocoa logistics, US investors eye LNG prospects, and EU lenders fund climate-smart agriculture. The candidate argues that diversification, not decoupling, is the goal.
If executed, his agenda could offer a template for other resource-rich states, including Congo-Brazzaville, that seek to blend Western capital markets with Eastern industrial know-how. Failure, conversely, could entrench scepticism about Russia’s capacity to deliver beyond security cooperation.
Calendar and Scenarios Ahead
Formally, the campaign does not start before late-2024, yet Don Mello’s diplomatic shuttle hints at an unofficial race already in motion. Opinion polls are scarce, but party defections and social-media metrics place him in the second tier behind the ruling RHDP.
Observers sketch three scenarios. In the first, his technocratic platform attracts a coalition of urban youth and disgruntled civil servants, propelling him into a runoff. In the second, institutional hurdles and funding gaps reduce his impact to that of a kingmaker. In the third, geopolitical headwinds—such as tighter US sanctions on Russian partners—clip his foreign-policy selling point.
Between Hype and Experience
Veterans of Ivorian politics caution against over-interpreting foreign endorsements, recalling that previous outsiders faltered once domestic patronage networks closed ranks. Don Mello counters by highlighting his tenure as public works chief, during which he oversaw the third Abidjan bridge—still cited as a benchmark for public-private coordination.
Whether this track record outweighs the risks of a polarising geopolitical alignment will hinge on the electorate’s appetite for change versus continuity. The next twelve months promise a revealing stress-test for slogans of sovereignty in an interconnected Africa.
