EU Migration Pact 2026: Rome’s Quiet North Africa Push

Ce qu’il faut retenir sur le Pacte migratoire européen

The EU Migration Pact, adopted in 2024, enters into force this year, setting the architecture for a more standardized European approach to asylum management and returns. In practical terms, the new framework is expected to increase pressure on partner countries around the Mediterranean to cooperate on the handling of rejected asylum seekers originating from Africa.

Against that backdrop, Italy has positioned itself at the forefront of implementation diplomacy. Rome has already engaged Algeria, Tunisia and Libya—countries expected, under the new rules, to be among the most solicited for hosting arrangements linked to the return of people whose asylum applications have been refused.

Italie–Algérie–Tunisie–Libye : une coordination quadripartite en marche

A first meeting of the Quadripartite Steering Committee—bringing together Algeria, Italy, Libya and Tunisia—was held in Algiers on 26 December 2025. The body is tasked with discussing voluntary return mechanisms, a theme that has become central to the EU’s operational playbook and to the political narratives surrounding “orderly” migration management.

The Algiers session also underscored how Rome is attempting to shape the sequence of coordination. By convening early with North African counterparts most directly affected by the pact’s return-related dimensions, Italy signaled a preference for building bilateral and minilateral understandings before the broader European debate settles into a shared rhythm.

Rome en chef de file sur les retours : un message diplomatique

The meeting logically confirmed that migration has become a priority file for Italy’s external action in the central Mediterranean. In this configuration, Rome appears determined to take the lead on returns and voluntary repatriation discussions, aiming to translate a European legal framework into operational channels with key states along migration routes.

Notably, the approach was described as being pursued without prior reference to some of Italy’s closest Mediterranean partners, such as France and Greece, even though they are also directly concerned. This sequencing matters: it can accelerate implementation, but it also reshapes intra-European coordination by concentrating agenda-setting power in the hands of the state that moves first.

Contexte : l’entrée en vigueur du Pacte et ses effets attendus

The migration pact is designed to harmonize procedures across the EU, including faster processing and clearer rules on responsibility-sharing and returns. The political logic is to reduce irregular movements inside Europe while presenting a credible enforcement pillar alongside asylum protections.

For North African partners, the sensitive issue remains the practical burden implied by cooperation on return arrangements. The fact that Algeria, Tunisia and Libya are singled out as likely to receive the largest number of rejected asylum seekers gives their diplomacy a stronger bargaining position, while also placing them under sharper European scrutiny.

Calendrier : de l’adoption en 2024 à l’applicabilité en 2026

Adopted in 2024, the pact’s implementation phase has unfolded through technical preparation and early political contacts with partner countries. This year marks the beginning of entry into force, with the more consequential provisions expected to structure European action as the 2026 applicability horizon approaches.

The 26 December 2025 meeting in Algiers sits squarely within this ramp-up period. It suggests that Italy is trying to pre-position understandings on voluntary returns before the pact’s mechanisms reach full operational tempo, thereby reducing uncertainty for both European and North African administrations.

Acteurs : administrations, partenaires méditerranéens et équilibres régionaux

The steering committee format brings together four states whose cooperation is often portrayed as indispensable for managing central Mediterranean migration flows. Within the EU, Italy’s activism reflects both geographic exposure and political incentives to demonstrate control over arrivals and returns.

At the same time, the absence of prior consultation with France and Greece, as described, highlights an enduring tension between national initiatives and collective EU diplomacy. In a domain where credibility depends on coordination, such minilateral formats can be read either as pragmatic problem-solving or as a unilateral shortcut that others later have to absorb.

Scénarios : ce que la diplomatie migratoire italienne peut produire

One scenario is that early quadripartite coordination accelerates operational pathways for voluntary returns, offering the EU an implementation model that could be replicated with other partners. If it delivers measurable outcomes, Italy may strengthen its standing as a policy entrepreneur within the Union’s Mediterranean agenda.

Another scenario is more political: minilateral moves could generate friction among European coastal states if they feel sidelined from negotiations that will affect them. Either way, the Algiers meeting signals that, as the pact approaches full applicability, migration management is becoming not only a policy question but also a contest over leadership and sequencing in Euro-Mediterranean diplomacy.

Cartes, graphiques et photos : éléments éditoriaux recommandés

Map (source: EU institutional documents cited in the original article): central Mediterranean migration routes and the four-country quadripartite perimeter (Italy, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya), to visualize why these interlocutors are central in Rome’s approach.

Chart (source: EU Migration Pact adoption timeline referenced in the original article): a simple timeline from 2024 adoption to entry into force this year and the 2026 applicability horizon, highlighting the 26 December 2025 Algiers meeting.

Photo (caption suggestion): “Algiers, 26 December 2025: the first meeting of the Quadripartite Steering Committee on voluntary returns brings together Algeria, Italy, Libya and Tunisia (source: as referenced in the original article).”